An online procurement auction for power demand response in storage-assisted smart grids

Abstract

The quintessential problem in a smart grid is the matching between power supply and demand - a perfect balance across the temporal domain, for the stable operation of the power network. Recent studies have revealed the critical role of electricity storage devices, as exemplified by rechargeable batteries and plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs), in helping achieve the balance through power arbitrage. Such potential from batteries and PEVs can not be fully realized without an appropriate economic mechanism that incentivizes energy discharging at times when supply is tight. This work aims at a systematic study of such demand response problem in storage-assisted smart grids through a well-designed online procurement auction mechanism. The long-term social welfare maximization problem is naturally formulated into a linear integer program. We first apply a primal-dual optimization algorithm to decompose the online auction design problem into a series of one-round auction design problems, achieving a small loss in competitive ratio. For the one round auction, we show that social welfare maximization is still NP-hard, and design a primal-dual approximation algorithm that works in concert with the decomposition algorithm. The end result is a truthful power procurement auction that is online, truthful, and 2-competitive in typical scenarios.