File Download
There are no files associated with this item.
Links for fulltext
(May Require Subscription)
- Publisher Website: 10.1017/S0034412510000521
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-80555146670
- WOS: WOS:000297508800007
- Find via
Supplementary
- Citations:
- Appears in Collections:
Article: Solving a paradox against concrete-composite Christology: A modified hylomorphic proposal
| Title | Solving a paradox against concrete-composite Christology: A modified hylomorphic proposal |
|---|---|
| Authors | |
| Issue Date | 2011 |
| Citation | Religious Studies, 2011, v. 47, n. 4, p. 493-502 How to Cite? |
| Abstract | A paradox adapted from the well-known 'paradox of increase' has been formulated against composite Christology in recent literature. I argue that concrete-composite Christologists can reply by denying the premise that the pre-incarnate divine nature=the Second Person of the Trinity. This denial can be made by modifying a hylomorphic theory of individuals. Using an analogy from material coinciding objects, this modified theory provides an illuminating account of how a person can gain (or lose) parts over time but remain numerically identical, and it demonstrates that concrete nature and person are not the same thing. © 2010 Cambridge University Press. |
| Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/206259 |
| ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 0.5 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.395 |
| ISI Accession Number ID |
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Loke, Andrew | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2014-10-22T01:25:32Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2014-10-22T01:25:32Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2011 | - |
| dc.identifier.citation | Religious Studies, 2011, v. 47, n. 4, p. 493-502 | - |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0034-4125 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/206259 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | A paradox adapted from the well-known 'paradox of increase' has been formulated against composite Christology in recent literature. I argue that concrete-composite Christologists can reply by denying the premise that the pre-incarnate divine nature=the Second Person of the Trinity. This denial can be made by modifying a hylomorphic theory of individuals. Using an analogy from material coinciding objects, this modified theory provides an illuminating account of how a person can gain (or lose) parts over time but remain numerically identical, and it demonstrates that concrete nature and person are not the same thing. © 2010 Cambridge University Press. | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.relation.ispartof | Religious Studies | - |
| dc.title | Solving a paradox against concrete-composite Christology: A modified hylomorphic proposal | - |
| dc.type | Article | - |
| dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1017/S0034412510000521 | - |
| dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-80555146670 | - |
| dc.identifier.volume | 47 | - |
| dc.identifier.issue | 4 | - |
| dc.identifier.spage | 493 | - |
| dc.identifier.epage | 502 | - |
| dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000297508800007 | - |
| dc.identifier.issnl | 0034-4125 | - |