Saying as action: Philosophy of language in the Zhuangzi

Abstract

This paper suggests that the central thesis in the Zhuāngzǐ concerning the philosophy of language is that ‘saying’ is action, which is contrasted with two other claims originating with earlier schools. One conceives of some old sayings as guidance for action, as presented by followers of Confucians, and the other words as reliable references to the world, as explored by the Mohist school. While some arguments by the Zhuangzists are clearly anti-linguistic in the sense that they regard words as incapable of expressing what the Dao is, it is also evident that they use language effectively to argue against their opponents and to explain the Dao in various ways. I shall argue that the main focus of the Zhuangzian criticism of specific usage of language lies in the following two areas: firstly the claim that sayings, by identifying certain paradigmatic patterns in the relation between actions and consequences, can guide people’s way of life: and, secondly, in the claim that words have their own, fixed references independent of the context in which they are used. The texts, consequently, suggest that ‘sayings’, like any other actions, should flexibly respond to the continuously changing world in order to follow the Dao.