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Article: China as a regulatory state
Title | China as a regulatory state |
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Authors | |
Keywords | Regulatory state Disorder costs Dictatorship costs Market economy models China's economic reform |
Issue Date | 2009 |
Publisher | Bank of Finland. Institute for Economies in Transition |
Citation | BOFIT Discussion Papers, 2009, Working Papers Series, paper no. 17/2009 How to Cite? |
Abstract | Market economy models differ in the degree of the power of the government vis-à-vis the market in the economy. Under the classifications set forth by Glaeser and Shleifer (2002, 2003), and Djankov et al. (2003), these market models range from those emphasizing low government intervention in the market (private orderings and private litigation through courts) to those where the state is an active participant (regulatory state). This paper, using data from a survey of 3,073 private enterprises in China, constructs an index to quantify the power of the government vis-à-vis the market. Regional government power is found to vary considerably across China's regions. Notably, enterprises located in regions where government exerts more power in the market perform better, suggesting that the regulatory state model of the market economy is appropriate for China. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/200280 |
ISSN | |
SSRN |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Du, J | - |
dc.contributor.author | Lu, Y | - |
dc.contributor.author | Tao, Z | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-08-04T03:49:24Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2014-08-04T03:49:24Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2009 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | BOFIT Discussion Papers, 2009, Working Papers Series, paper no. 17/2009 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1456-5889 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/200280 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Market economy models differ in the degree of the power of the government vis-à-vis the market in the economy. Under the classifications set forth by Glaeser and Shleifer (2002, 2003), and Djankov et al. (2003), these market models range from those emphasizing low government intervention in the market (private orderings and private litigation through courts) to those where the state is an active participant (regulatory state). This paper, using data from a survey of 3,073 private enterprises in China, constructs an index to quantify the power of the government vis-à-vis the market. Regional government power is found to vary considerably across China's regions. Notably, enterprises located in regions where government exerts more power in the market perform better, suggesting that the regulatory state model of the market economy is appropriate for China. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.publisher | Bank of Finland. Institute for Economies in Transition | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | BOFIT Discussion Papers | - |
dc.subject | Regulatory state | - |
dc.subject | Disorder costs | - |
dc.subject | Dictatorship costs | - |
dc.subject | Market economy models | - |
dc.subject | China's economic reform | - |
dc.title | China as a regulatory state | en_US |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.email | Lu, Y: xzhongkanson@business.hku.hk | - |
dc.identifier.email | Tao, Z: ztao@hku.hk | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_OA_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.2139/ssrn.1489412 | - |
dc.publisher.place | Finland | - |
dc.identifier.ssrn | 1489412 | - |
dc.customcontrol.immutable | sml 140804 | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 1456-4564 | - |