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Article: Who pays more 'tributes' to the government? sectoral corruption of China’s private enterprises

TitleWho pays more 'tributes' to the government? sectoral corruption of China’s private enterprises
Authors
Issue Date2014
PublisherSpringer Verlag Dordrecht. The Journal's web site is located at http://springerlink.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre=journal&issn=0925-4994
Citation
Crime, Law and Social Change, 2014, v. 61 n. 3, p. 309-303 How to Cite?
AbstractWhich industry sectors bribe the government and, in turn, are exploited by the government the most in China? Or, as commonly satirized by the people, which sectors pay the most “tributes” (shanggong) to government officials? This article attempts to answer these questions by proposing a meso-level approach, which examines corruption in China at the sectoral level. We use a firm-level survey from 1997 to 2006 in China and treat two types of payments by private enterprises—public relations– building fees (yingchou) and forced apportionment of funds (tanpai)—as indicators of potential corruption in a sector. We find that the most corrupt sectors are those that rely on scarce and less mobile resources controlled by the government. Thus, further reform in the factor markets is necessary to reduce corruption caused by government intervention in the allocation of important resources.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/196855
ISSN
2023 Impact Factor: 1.0
2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.331
ISI Accession Number ID

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorZhu, Jen_US
dc.contributor.authorWu, Yen_US
dc.date.accessioned2014-04-29T03:46:25Z-
dc.date.available2014-04-29T03:46:25Z-
dc.date.issued2014en_US
dc.identifier.citationCrime, Law and Social Change, 2014, v. 61 n. 3, p. 309-303en_US
dc.identifier.issn0925-4994-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/196855-
dc.description.abstractWhich industry sectors bribe the government and, in turn, are exploited by the government the most in China? Or, as commonly satirized by the people, which sectors pay the most “tributes” (shanggong) to government officials? This article attempts to answer these questions by proposing a meso-level approach, which examines corruption in China at the sectoral level. We use a firm-level survey from 1997 to 2006 in China and treat two types of payments by private enterprises—public relations– building fees (yingchou) and forced apportionment of funds (tanpai)—as indicators of potential corruption in a sector. We find that the most corrupt sectors are those that rely on scarce and less mobile resources controlled by the government. Thus, further reform in the factor markets is necessary to reduce corruption caused by government intervention in the allocation of important resources.en_US
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherSpringer Verlag Dordrecht. The Journal's web site is located at http://springerlink.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre=journal&issn=0925-4994en_US
dc.relation.ispartofCrime, Law and Social Changeen_US
dc.rightsThe original publication is available at www.springerlink.comen_US
dc.titleWho pays more 'tributes' to the government? sectoral corruption of China’s private enterprisesen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.emailZhu, J: zhujn@hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityZhu, J=rp01624en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s10611-013-9504-4en_US
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-84897427407-
dc.identifier.hkuros228688en_US
dc.identifier.volume61en_US
dc.identifier.issue3-
dc.identifier.spage309en_US
dc.identifier.epage303en_US
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000333467500004-
dc.publisher.placeNetherlandsen_US
dc.identifier.issnl0925-4994-

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