Delegation structure and incentives: the case of multiple agents

Abstract

The existing literature on delegation and incentives has largely focused on the question of whether and when to delegate.In this paper,we consider the incentive effects of different delegation structures in a model with one principal and two agents,and compare three delegation structures: 'parallel delegation', 'preferential delegation',and 'sequential delegation'.We find that when private benefit to the winning agent is large,the agents are highly heterogeneous,and the negative externality between the agents is large, then parallel delegation tends to be dominated by the other two; otherwise, parallel delegation dominates. When the project is urgent, sequential delegation is dominated; otherwise, sequential delegation is optimal. Our research casts new lights on the internal organizations of organizations such as corporation boards, parliaments, as well as government structures.

現有關于授權與激勵的文獻側重于考察'是否授權'的問題。本文研究不同授權結構之間激勵效果的比較。沿襲Aghion and Tirole(1997),本文在'一個委托人-兩個代理人'的框架下,區分了'平行授權'、'優先授權'和'次第授權'三種授權結構。我們發現,項目帶給代理人的凈私人收益越大、代理人之間異質性越強、代理人之間的正外部性越弱(或負外部性越強),次第授權和優先授權越可能好過平行授權;反之,則平行授權越可能占優。當項目必須完成的時間越緊急,平行授權或優先授權越可能好過次第授權;反之,則次第授權越可能占優。我們的發現從激勵和授權角度對組織(比如,董事會、公司、議會、政府機構)內部授權結構的一些現象提供了一些解釋。