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Conference Paper: Non-Transferable Proxy Re-Encryption Scheme
Title | Non-Transferable Proxy Re-Encryption Scheme |
---|---|
Authors | |
Keywords | non-transferable property PKG despotism proxy re-encryption |
Issue Date | 2012 |
Publisher | I E E E. The Journal's web site is located at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/conhome.jsp?punumber=1002526 |
Citation | The 5th IFIP International Conference on New Technologies, Mobility and Security (NTMS’12), Istanbul, Turkey, 7-10 May 2012. In Proceedings of the International Conference on New Technologies, Mobility and Security, 2012, p. article no. 6208714 How to Cite? |
Abstract | A proxy re-encryption (PRE) scheme allows a proxy to re-encrypt a ciphertext for Alice (delegator) to a ciphertext for Bob (delegatee) without seeing the underlying plaintext. However, existing PRE schemes generally suffer from at least one of the followings. Some schemes fail to provide the non-transferable property in which the proxy and the delegatee can collude to further delegate the decryption right to anyone. This is the main open problem left for PRE schemes. Other schemes assume the existence of a fully trusted private key generator (PKG) to generate the re-encryption key to be used by the proxy for re-encrypting a given ciphertext for a target delegatee. But this poses two problems in PRE schemes if the PKG is malicious: the PKG in their schemes may decrypt both original ciphertexts and re-encrypted ciphertexts (referred as the key escrow problem); and the PKG can generate reencryption key for arbitrary delegatees without permission from the delegator (we refer to it as the PKG despotism problem). In this paper, we propose the first non-transferable proxy re-encryption scheme which successfully achieves the nontransferable property. We show that the new scheme solved the PKG despotism problem and key escrow problem as well. © 2012 IEEE. |
Description | SEC8: Selected topics in Information Security |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/192710 |
ISBN | |
ISSN |
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | He, Y | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Chim, TW | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Hui, CK | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Yiu, SM | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-11-20T04:56:56Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2013-11-20T04:56:56Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2012 | en_US |
dc.identifier.citation | The 5th IFIP International Conference on New Technologies, Mobility and Security (NTMS’12), Istanbul, Turkey, 7-10 May 2012. In Proceedings of the International Conference on New Technologies, Mobility and Security, 2012, p. article no. 6208714 | en_US |
dc.identifier.isbn | 9781467302289 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 2157-4952 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/192710 | - |
dc.description | SEC8: Selected topics in Information Security | - |
dc.description.abstract | A proxy re-encryption (PRE) scheme allows a proxy to re-encrypt a ciphertext for Alice (delegator) to a ciphertext for Bob (delegatee) without seeing the underlying plaintext. However, existing PRE schemes generally suffer from at least one of the followings. Some schemes fail to provide the non-transferable property in which the proxy and the delegatee can collude to further delegate the decryption right to anyone. This is the main open problem left for PRE schemes. Other schemes assume the existence of a fully trusted private key generator (PKG) to generate the re-encryption key to be used by the proxy for re-encrypting a given ciphertext for a target delegatee. But this poses two problems in PRE schemes if the PKG is malicious: the PKG in their schemes may decrypt both original ciphertexts and re-encrypted ciphertexts (referred as the key escrow problem); and the PKG can generate reencryption key for arbitrary delegatees without permission from the delegator (we refer to it as the PKG despotism problem). In this paper, we propose the first non-transferable proxy re-encryption scheme which successfully achieves the nontransferable property. We show that the new scheme solved the PKG despotism problem and key escrow problem as well. © 2012 IEEE. | en_US |
dc.language | eng | en_US |
dc.publisher | I E E E. The Journal's web site is located at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/conhome.jsp?punumber=1002526 | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Proceedings of the International Conference on New Technologies, Mobility and Security | en_US |
dc.subject | non-transferable property | - |
dc.subject | PKG despotism | - |
dc.subject | proxy re-encryption | - |
dc.title | Non-Transferable Proxy Re-Encryption Scheme | en_US |
dc.type | Conference_Paper | en_US |
dc.identifier.email | Chim, TW: chimtw@hkucc.hku.hk | - |
dc.identifier.email | Hui, CK: hui@cs.hku.hk | - |
dc.identifier.email | Yiu, SM: smyiu@cs.hku.hk | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | en_US |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1109/NTMS.2012.6208714 | en_US |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-84863979758 | - |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 211614 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | article no. 6208714 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | article no. 6208714 | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 2157-4952 | - |