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Article: Corporate ownership structure and bank loan syndicate structure
Title | Corporate ownership structure and bank loan syndicate structure |
---|---|
Authors | |
Keywords | Ownership structure Excess control rights Syndicated loans |
Issue Date | 2012 |
Publisher | Elsevier. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/0304405X |
Citation | Journal of Financial Economics, 2012, v. 104 n. 1, p. 1-22 How to Cite? |
Abstract | Using a novel data set on corporate ownership and control, we show that the divergence between the control rights and cash-flow rights of a borrowing firm's largest ultimate owner has a significant impact on the concentration and composition of the firm's loan syndicate. When the control-ownership divergence is large, lead arrangers form syndicates with structures that facilitate enhanced due diligence and monitoring efforts. These syndicates tend to be relatively concentrated and composed of domestic banks that are geographically close to the borrowing firms and that have lending expertise related to the industries of the borrowers. We also examine factors that influence the relation between ownership structure and syndicate structure, including lead arranger reputation, prior lending relationship, borrowing firm informational opacity, presence of multiple large owners, laws and institutions, and financial crises. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/192341 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 10.4 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 13.655 |
SSRN | |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Lin, C | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Ma, Y | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Malatesta, P | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Xuan, Y | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-10-24T01:50:03Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2013-10-24T01:50:03Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2012 | en_US |
dc.identifier.citation | Journal of Financial Economics, 2012, v. 104 n. 1, p. 1-22 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 0304-405X | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/192341 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Using a novel data set on corporate ownership and control, we show that the divergence between the control rights and cash-flow rights of a borrowing firm's largest ultimate owner has a significant impact on the concentration and composition of the firm's loan syndicate. When the control-ownership divergence is large, lead arrangers form syndicates with structures that facilitate enhanced due diligence and monitoring efforts. These syndicates tend to be relatively concentrated and composed of domestic banks that are geographically close to the borrowing firms and that have lending expertise related to the industries of the borrowers. We also examine factors that influence the relation between ownership structure and syndicate structure, including lead arranger reputation, prior lending relationship, borrowing firm informational opacity, presence of multiple large owners, laws and institutions, and financial crises. | - |
dc.language | eng | en_US |
dc.publisher | Elsevier. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/0304405X | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Journal of Financial Economics | en_US |
dc.rights | This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. | - |
dc.rights | NOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in <Journal of Financial Economics>. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in PUBLICATION, [VOL 104, ISSUE 1, (2012)] DOI 10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.10.006 | - |
dc.subject | Ownership structure | - |
dc.subject | Excess control rights | - |
dc.subject | Syndicated loans | - |
dc.title | Corporate ownership structure and bank loan syndicate structure | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
dc.description.nature | postprint | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.10.006 | en_US |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-84857456890 | en_US |
dc.identifier.volume | 104 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issue | 1 | en_US |
dc.identifier.spage | 1 | en_US |
dc.identifier.epage | 22 | en_US |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000301092100001 | - |
dc.identifier.ssrn | 1727752 | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0304-405X | - |