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Conference Paper: The exponential mechanism for social welfare: Private, truthful, and nearly optimal

TitleThe exponential mechanism for social welfare: Private, truthful, and nearly optimal
Authors
Huang, ZKannan, S
KeywordsDifferential Privacy
Exponential Mechanism
Mechanism Design
Issue Date2012
Citation
Proceedings - Annual Ieee Symposium On Foundations Of Computer Science, Focs, 2012, p. 140-149 How to Cite?
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/FOCS.2012.36
AbstractIn this paper we show that for any mechanism design problem with the objective of maximizing social welfare, the exponential mechanism can be implemented as a truthful mechanism while still preserving differential privacy. Our instantiation of the exponential mechanism can be interpreted as a generalization of the VCG mechanism in the sense that the VCG mechanism is the extreme case when the privacy parameter goes to infinity. To our knowledge, this is the first general tool for designing mechanisms that are both truthful and differentially private. © 2012 IEEE.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/188503
ISSN
0272-5428
2020 SCImago Journal Rankings: 2.949
ISI Accession Number ID
WOS:000316999700016
References
References in Scopus

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorHuang, Zen_US
dc.contributor.authorKannan, Sen_US
dc.date.accessioned2013-09-03T04:08:45Z-
dc.date.available2013-09-03T04:08:45Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.citationProceedings - Annual Ieee Symposium On Foundations Of Computer Science, Focs, 2012, p. 140-149en_US
dc.identifier.issn0272-5428en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/188503-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we show that for any mechanism design problem with the objective of maximizing social welfare, the exponential mechanism can be implemented as a truthful mechanism while still preserving differential privacy. Our instantiation of the exponential mechanism can be interpreted as a generalization of the VCG mechanism in the sense that the VCG mechanism is the extreme case when the privacy parameter goes to infinity. To our knowledge, this is the first general tool for designing mechanisms that are both truthful and differentially private. © 2012 IEEE.en_US
dc.languageengen_US
dc.relation.ispartofProceedings - Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCSen_US
dc.subjectDifferential Privacyen_US
dc.subjectExponential Mechanismen_US
dc.subjectMechanism Designen_US
dc.titleThe exponential mechanism for social welfare: Private, truthful, and nearly optimalen_US
dc.typeConference_Paperen_US
dc.identifier.emailHuang, Z: hzhiyi@cis.upenn.eduen_US
dc.identifier.authorityHuang, Z=rp01804en_US
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltexten_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/FOCS.2012.36en_US
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-84871966152en_US
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-84871966152&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_US
dc.identifier.spage140en_US
dc.identifier.epage149en_US
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000316999700016-
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridHuang, Z=55494568500en_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridKannan, S=7102340548en_US
dc.identifier.issnl0272-5428-

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