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Conference Paper: Four models of equality in Common Law Asia

TitleFour models of equality in Common Law Asia
Authors
Issue Date2013
PublisherAll Academic Inc..
Citation
The 2013 Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association (LSA), Boston, MA., 30 May-2 June 2013. How to Cite?
AbstractAlmost every modern constitution contains a general equal protection clause that seeks to guard against arbitrary or discriminatory state practices. In most western democracies, this constitutional guarantee of equality is judicially understood to embody a substantive ideal - courts are required to identify prima facie prohibited bases of legislative differentiations and where they do exist, the onus is on the government to demonstrate how these differentiations are justifiable. Unfortunately, within common law Asia, many territorial courts do not uphold this substantive model of equality. Neither are they homogenous nor consistent in upholding a particular model of equality. In fact, a survey of the constitutional practices of Malaysia, Singapore and Hong Kong reveals four judicial approaches to equality. First, we may observe a formal model of equality where the courts merely require equal treatment for all persons who are situated within the same legislative category. This is merely a principle for consistency. Second, a corollary of the formal principle, we may find the rational connection model. This model provides that a statutory provision would be deemed arbitrary if the legislative distinctions do not have a rational connection to the object sought to be achieved by the law in question. Third, the “forbidden personal characteristics” model is in essence the substantive model of equality commonly applied in the West – courts seek to identify prima facie forbidden grounds of statutory differentiations based on an individual’s personal traits (i.e. personal characteristics for which individuals have been historically subjected to stereotype and/or prejudice) that requires State justification. Finally, the “fundamental rights” model of equality assumes that all legislative differentiations that affect an individual’s exercise of her fundamental rights are prima facie discriminatory unless justified. In this Paper, I shall argue that the the “forbidden personal characteristics” model of equality serves as the only logical and meaningful constitutional standard of equality for courts in these Asian jurisdictions to apply.
DescriptionMeeting Theme: Power, Privilege, and the Pursuit of Justice: Legal Challenges in Precarious Times
Paper session - Comparative Perspectives on Judicial Review
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/187166

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorYap, PJen_US
dc.date.accessioned2013-08-20T12:31:29Z-
dc.date.available2013-08-20T12:31:29Z-
dc.date.issued2013en_US
dc.identifier.citationThe 2013 Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association (LSA), Boston, MA., 30 May-2 June 2013.-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/187166-
dc.descriptionMeeting Theme: Power, Privilege, and the Pursuit of Justice: Legal Challenges in Precarious Times-
dc.descriptionPaper session - Comparative Perspectives on Judicial Review-
dc.description.abstractAlmost every modern constitution contains a general equal protection clause that seeks to guard against arbitrary or discriminatory state practices. In most western democracies, this constitutional guarantee of equality is judicially understood to embody a substantive ideal - courts are required to identify prima facie prohibited bases of legislative differentiations and where they do exist, the onus is on the government to demonstrate how these differentiations are justifiable. Unfortunately, within common law Asia, many territorial courts do not uphold this substantive model of equality. Neither are they homogenous nor consistent in upholding a particular model of equality. In fact, a survey of the constitutional practices of Malaysia, Singapore and Hong Kong reveals four judicial approaches to equality. First, we may observe a formal model of equality where the courts merely require equal treatment for all persons who are situated within the same legislative category. This is merely a principle for consistency. Second, a corollary of the formal principle, we may find the rational connection model. This model provides that a statutory provision would be deemed arbitrary if the legislative distinctions do not have a rational connection to the object sought to be achieved by the law in question. Third, the “forbidden personal characteristics” model is in essence the substantive model of equality commonly applied in the West – courts seek to identify prima facie forbidden grounds of statutory differentiations based on an individual’s personal traits (i.e. personal characteristics for which individuals have been historically subjected to stereotype and/or prejudice) that requires State justification. Finally, the “fundamental rights” model of equality assumes that all legislative differentiations that affect an individual’s exercise of her fundamental rights are prima facie discriminatory unless justified. In this Paper, I shall argue that the the “forbidden personal characteristics” model of equality serves as the only logical and meaningful constitutional standard of equality for courts in these Asian jurisdictions to apply.-
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherAll Academic Inc..-
dc.relation.ispartofThe Law and Society Association (LSA) International Meeting 2013-
dc.titleFour models of equality in Common Law Asiaen_US
dc.typeConference_Paperen_US
dc.identifier.emailYap, PJ: pjyap@hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityYap, PJ=rp01274en_US
dc.description.naturelink_to_OA_fulltext-
dc.identifier.hkuros220145en_US
dc.publisher.placeUnited States-

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