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Article: The informativeness of earnings and management's issuance of earnings forecasts
Title | The informativeness of earnings and management's issuance of earnings forecasts |
---|---|
Authors | |
Keywords | Earnings Informativeness Management Forecast |
Issue Date | 2006 |
Publisher | Elsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jae |
Citation | Journal Of Accounting And Economics, 2006, v. 42 n. 3, p. 439-458 How to Cite? |
Abstract | Theory suggests that managers issue earnings forecasts to reduce information asymmetry. An earnings forecast is more effective in reducing information asymmetry if it contains earnings news that is relatively more informative about the firm's value. We hypothesize that a manager is more likely to issue an earnings forecast if investors perceive that earnings are more informative. We measure earnings informativeness by estimating the firm's earnings response coefficient (ERC) in quarters prior to the forecast issuance decision. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that the firm's historic ERC is positively associated with management's issuance of earnings forecasts. © 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/177970 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 5.4 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 8.337 |
ISI Accession Number ID | |
References |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Lennox, CS | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Park, CW | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-12-19T09:41:06Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-12-19T09:41:06Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2006 | en_US |
dc.identifier.citation | Journal Of Accounting And Economics, 2006, v. 42 n. 3, p. 439-458 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 0165-4101 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/177970 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Theory suggests that managers issue earnings forecasts to reduce information asymmetry. An earnings forecast is more effective in reducing information asymmetry if it contains earnings news that is relatively more informative about the firm's value. We hypothesize that a manager is more likely to issue an earnings forecast if investors perceive that earnings are more informative. We measure earnings informativeness by estimating the firm's earnings response coefficient (ERC) in quarters prior to the forecast issuance decision. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that the firm's historic ERC is positively associated with management's issuance of earnings forecasts. © 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. | en_US |
dc.language | eng | en_US |
dc.publisher | Elsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jae | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartof | Journal of Accounting and Economics | en_US |
dc.subject | Earnings Informativeness | en_US |
dc.subject | Management Forecast | en_US |
dc.title | The informativeness of earnings and management's issuance of earnings forecasts | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
dc.identifier.email | Park, CW: acparkc@hku.hk | en_US |
dc.identifier.authority | Park, CW=rp01090 | en_US |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | en_US |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.jacceco.2006.05.001 | en_US |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-33748483643 | en_US |
dc.relation.references | http://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-33748483643&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpage | en_US |
dc.identifier.volume | 42 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issue | 3 | en_US |
dc.identifier.spage | 439 | en_US |
dc.identifier.epage | 458 | en_US |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000241013500006 | - |
dc.publisher.place | Netherlands | en_US |
dc.identifier.scopusauthorid | Lennox, CS=14521159700 | en_US |
dc.identifier.scopusauthorid | Park, CW=37062708100 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0165-4101 | - |