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- Publisher Website: 10.1016/S0929-1199(01)00028-1
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-0037788737
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Article: Board leadership structure and CEO turnover
Title | Board leadership structure and CEO turnover |
---|---|
Authors | |
Keywords | Ceo Duties Ceo Turnover Corporate Governance Leadership Structure Sensitivity To Firm Performance |
Issue Date | 2002 |
Publisher | Elsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jcorpfin |
Citation | Journal Of Corporate Finance, 2002, v. 8 n. 1, p. 49-66 How to Cite? |
Abstract | We study whether bestowing chief executive officer (CEO) and board chairman duties on one individual affects a boards decision to dismiss an ineffective CEO. The results show that the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance is significantly lower when the CEO and chairman duties are vested in the same individual. These results are consistent with the view that the lack of independent leadership in firms that combine the CEO and Chairman positions makes it difficult for the board to remove poorly performing managers. © 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/177913 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 7.2 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 3.182 |
ISI Accession Number ID | |
References |
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Goyal, VK | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Park, CW | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-12-19T09:40:48Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-12-19T09:40:48Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2002 | en_US |
dc.identifier.citation | Journal Of Corporate Finance, 2002, v. 8 n. 1, p. 49-66 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 0929-1199 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/177913 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We study whether bestowing chief executive officer (CEO) and board chairman duties on one individual affects a boards decision to dismiss an ineffective CEO. The results show that the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance is significantly lower when the CEO and chairman duties are vested in the same individual. These results are consistent with the view that the lack of independent leadership in firms that combine the CEO and Chairman positions makes it difficult for the board to remove poorly performing managers. © 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. | en_US |
dc.language | eng | en_US |
dc.publisher | Elsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jcorpfin | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartof | Journal of Corporate Finance | en_US |
dc.subject | Ceo Duties | en_US |
dc.subject | Ceo Turnover | en_US |
dc.subject | Corporate Governance | en_US |
dc.subject | Leadership Structure | en_US |
dc.subject | Sensitivity To Firm Performance | en_US |
dc.title | Board leadership structure and CEO turnover | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
dc.identifier.email | Park, CW: acparkc@hku.hk | en_US |
dc.identifier.authority | Park, CW=rp01090 | en_US |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | en_US |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/S0929-1199(01)00028-1 | en_US |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-0037788737 | en_US |
dc.relation.references | http://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-0037788737&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpage | en_US |
dc.identifier.volume | 8 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issue | 1 | en_US |
dc.identifier.spage | 49 | en_US |
dc.identifier.epage | 66 | en_US |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000173622400003 | - |
dc.publisher.place | Netherlands | en_US |
dc.identifier.scopusauthorid | Goyal, VK=7005469570 | en_US |
dc.identifier.scopusauthorid | Park, CW=37062708100 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0929-1199 | - |