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- Publisher Website: 10.1016/S0165-4101(98)00044-5
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-0002993499
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Article: The effect of competition on CEO turnover
Title | The effect of competition on CEO turnover |
---|---|
Authors | |
Keywords | Ceo Performance Evaluation Ceo Turnover J33 J41 J63 M4 Management Compensation And Turnover Relative Performance Evaluation |
Issue Date | 1999 |
Publisher | Elsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jae |
Citation | Journal Of Accounting And Economics, 1999, v. 27 n. 1, p. 35-56 How to Cite? |
Abstract | Relative performance evaluation (RPE) is likely to improve boards of director's ability to identify unfit CEOs, and competition is likely to enhance the usefulness of RPE. Consistent with our hypotheses, the frequency of CEO turnover is greater in highly competitive industries than in less competitive industries. We also find that RPE-based (firm-specific) accounting measures are more closely associated with CEO turnover in high (low) competition industries than in low (high) competition industries. These findings suggest that the lack of support for RPE in prior studies results from not considering the effects of competition. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/177818 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 5.4 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 8.337 |
ISI Accession Number ID | |
References |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Defond, ML | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Park, CW | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-12-19T09:40:27Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-12-19T09:40:27Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 1999 | en_US |
dc.identifier.citation | Journal Of Accounting And Economics, 1999, v. 27 n. 1, p. 35-56 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 0165-4101 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/177818 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Relative performance evaluation (RPE) is likely to improve boards of director's ability to identify unfit CEOs, and competition is likely to enhance the usefulness of RPE. Consistent with our hypotheses, the frequency of CEO turnover is greater in highly competitive industries than in less competitive industries. We also find that RPE-based (firm-specific) accounting measures are more closely associated with CEO turnover in high (low) competition industries than in low (high) competition industries. These findings suggest that the lack of support for RPE in prior studies results from not considering the effects of competition. | en_US |
dc.language | eng | en_US |
dc.publisher | Elsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jae | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartof | Journal of Accounting and Economics | en_US |
dc.subject | Ceo Performance Evaluation | en_US |
dc.subject | Ceo Turnover | en_US |
dc.subject | J33 | en_US |
dc.subject | J41 | en_US |
dc.subject | J63 | en_US |
dc.subject | M4 | en_US |
dc.subject | Management Compensation And Turnover | en_US |
dc.subject | Relative Performance Evaluation | en_US |
dc.title | The effect of competition on CEO turnover | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
dc.identifier.email | Park, CW: acparkc@hku.hk | en_US |
dc.identifier.authority | Park, CW=rp01090 | en_US |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | en_US |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/S0165-4101(98)00044-5 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-0002993499 | en_US |
dc.relation.references | http://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-0002993499&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpage | en_US |
dc.identifier.volume | 27 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issue | 1 | en_US |
dc.identifier.spage | 35 | en_US |
dc.identifier.epage | 56 | en_US |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000079862200002 | - |
dc.publisher.place | Netherlands | en_US |
dc.identifier.scopusauthorid | DeFond, ML=6602107693 | en_US |
dc.identifier.scopusauthorid | Park, CW=37062708100 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0165-4101 | - |