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- Publisher Website: 10.1111/j.1467-9396.2008.00769.x
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Article: Endogenous lobbying positions
Title | Endogenous lobbying positions |
---|---|
Authors | |
Issue Date | 2008 |
Publisher | Blackwell Publishing Ltd. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0965-7576&site=1 |
Citation | Review Of International Economics, 2008, v. 16 n. 4, p. 641-653 How to Cite? |
Abstract | This paper develops a two-country, two-firm model to study equilibrium lobbying positions in intra-industry trade. A firm chooses either a protectionist position or a free-trade position. The model predicts that taking the free-trade lobbying position is an efficient firm's dominant strategy. If two firms have high costs (or when the demand is very weak), there exist two equilibria: either both firms take the free-trade position or both take the protectionist lobbying position. In other cases, both firms taking the free-trade lobbying position is a unique equilibrium. © 2008 The Authors Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/177761 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 1.0 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.593 |
ISI Accession Number ID | |
References |
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Qiu, LD | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-12-19T09:39:49Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-12-19T09:39:49Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2008 | en_US |
dc.identifier.citation | Review Of International Economics, 2008, v. 16 n. 4, p. 641-653 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 0965-7576 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/177761 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper develops a two-country, two-firm model to study equilibrium lobbying positions in intra-industry trade. A firm chooses either a protectionist position or a free-trade position. The model predicts that taking the free-trade lobbying position is an efficient firm's dominant strategy. If two firms have high costs (or when the demand is very weak), there exist two equilibria: either both firms take the free-trade position or both take the protectionist lobbying position. In other cases, both firms taking the free-trade lobbying position is a unique equilibrium. © 2008 The Authors Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. | en_US |
dc.language | eng | en_US |
dc.publisher | Blackwell Publishing Ltd. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0965-7576&site=1 | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartof | Review of International Economics | en_US |
dc.title | Endogenous lobbying positions | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
dc.identifier.email | Qiu, LD: larryqiu@hku.hk | en_US |
dc.identifier.authority | Qiu, LD=rp01093 | en_US |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | en_US |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1111/j.1467-9396.2008.00769.x | en_US |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-50249168800 | en_US |
dc.relation.references | http://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-50249168800&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpage | en_US |
dc.identifier.volume | 16 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issue | 4 | en_US |
dc.identifier.spage | 641 | en_US |
dc.identifier.epage | 653 | en_US |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1467-9396 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000207842700003 | - |
dc.publisher.place | United Kingdom | en_US |
dc.identifier.scopusauthorid | Qiu, LD=7201538008 | en_US |
dc.identifier.citeulike | 3151000 | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0965-7576 | - |