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Article: The North's intellectual property rights standard for the South?

TitleThe North's intellectual property rights standard for the South?
Authors
Lai, ELCQiu, LD
KeywordsIntellectual Property Rights
Multi-Sector Negotiation
Trips
Issue Date2003
PublisherElsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jie
Citation
Journal Of International Economics, 2003, v. 59 n. 1, p. 183-209 How to Cite?
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0022-1996(02)00090-9
AbstractWe build a multi-sectoral North-South trade model to analyze international intellectual property rights (IPR) protection. By comparing the Nash equilibrium IPR protection standard of the South (the developing countries) with that of the North (the developed countries), we find that the former is naturally weaker than the latter. Moreover, we show that both regions can gain from an agreement that requires the South to harmonize its IPR standards with those of the North, and the North to liberalize its traditional goods market. This demonstrates the merits of multi-sectoral negotiations in the GATT/WTO. © 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/177696
ISSN
0022-1996
2023 Impact Factor: 3.8
2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 4.583
ISI Accession Number ID
WOS:000180417300008
References
References in Scopus

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorLai, ELCen_US
dc.contributor.authorQiu, LDen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-12-19T09:39:34Z-
dc.date.available2012-12-19T09:39:34Z-
dc.date.issued2003en_US
dc.identifier.citationJournal Of International Economics, 2003, v. 59 n. 1, p. 183-209en_US
dc.identifier.issn0022-1996en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/177696-
dc.description.abstractWe build a multi-sectoral North-South trade model to analyze international intellectual property rights (IPR) protection. By comparing the Nash equilibrium IPR protection standard of the South (the developing countries) with that of the North (the developed countries), we find that the former is naturally weaker than the latter. Moreover, we show that both regions can gain from an agreement that requires the South to harmonize its IPR standards with those of the North, and the North to liberalize its traditional goods market. This demonstrates the merits of multi-sectoral negotiations in the GATT/WTO. © 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.en_US
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherElsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jieen_US
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of International Economicsen_US
dc.subjectIntellectual Property Rightsen_US
dc.subjectMulti-Sector Negotiationen_US
dc.subjectTripsen_US
dc.titleThe North's intellectual property rights standard for the South?en_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.emailQiu, LD: larryqiu@hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityQiu, LD=rp01093en_US
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltexten_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/S0022-1996(02)00090-9en_US
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-0037218011en_US
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-0037218011&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_US
dc.identifier.volume59en_US
dc.identifier.issue1en_US
dc.identifier.spage183en_US
dc.identifier.epage209en_US
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000180417300008-
dc.publisher.placeNetherlandsen_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridLai, ELC=7201466555en_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridQiu, LD=7201538008en_US
dc.identifier.issnl0022-1996-

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