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Article: Endogenous Sequencing in Strategic Trade Policy Games under Uncertainty
Title | Endogenous Sequencing in Strategic Trade Policy Games under Uncertainty |
---|---|
Authors | |
Keywords | Commitment Endogenous Timing Flexibility Strategic Trade Policy |
Issue Date | 1997 |
Publisher | Springer New York LLC. The Journal's web site is located at http://springerlink.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre=journal&issn=0923-7992 |
Citation | Open Economies Review, 1997, v. 8 n. 4, p. 353-369 How to Cite? |
Abstract | This paper examines a strategic trade policy game with endogenous timing. A trade-off between commitment and flexibility is identified. The equilibrium timing of trade policy decisions is shown to highly depend on the degree of demand uncertainty. When demand uncertainty is low, countervailing duties will never be used because the home government always sets its import tariff before the foreign government sets its export subsidy. When demand uncertainty reaches a threshold level, the home government starts to find it optimal to move second with positive probability. As a result, we provide an economic rationale for the prevailing use of countervailing duties in practice. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/177669 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 1.5 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.478 |
ISI Accession Number ID | |
References |
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Wong, KP | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Chow, KW | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-12-19T09:39:29Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-12-19T09:39:29Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 1997 | en_US |
dc.identifier.citation | Open Economies Review, 1997, v. 8 n. 4, p. 353-369 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 0923-7992 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/177669 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper examines a strategic trade policy game with endogenous timing. A trade-off between commitment and flexibility is identified. The equilibrium timing of trade policy decisions is shown to highly depend on the degree of demand uncertainty. When demand uncertainty is low, countervailing duties will never be used because the home government always sets its import tariff before the foreign government sets its export subsidy. When demand uncertainty reaches a threshold level, the home government starts to find it optimal to move second with positive probability. As a result, we provide an economic rationale for the prevailing use of countervailing duties in practice. | en_US |
dc.language | eng | en_US |
dc.publisher | Springer New York LLC. The Journal's web site is located at http://springerlink.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre=journal&issn=0923-7992 | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartof | Open Economies Review | en_US |
dc.rights | The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com | - |
dc.subject | Commitment | en_US |
dc.subject | Endogenous Timing | en_US |
dc.subject | Flexibility | en_US |
dc.subject | Strategic Trade Policy | en_US |
dc.title | Endogenous Sequencing in Strategic Trade Policy Games under Uncertainty | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
dc.identifier.email | Wong, KP: kpwongc@hkucc.hku.hk | en_US |
dc.identifier.authority | Wong, KP=rp01112 | en_US |
dc.description.nature | postprint | en_US |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-0031410814 | en_US |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 36202 | - |
dc.relation.references | http://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-0031410814&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpage | en_US |
dc.identifier.volume | 8 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issue | 4 | en_US |
dc.identifier.spage | 353 | en_US |
dc.identifier.epage | 369 | en_US |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:A1997YB94900002 | - |
dc.publisher.place | United States | en_US |
dc.identifier.scopusauthorid | Wong, KP=7404759417 | en_US |
dc.identifier.scopusauthorid | Chow, KW=7202180874 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0923-7992 | - |