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Article: A Maximal Domain for the Existence of Strategy-Proof Rules
Title | A Maximal Domain for the Existence of Strategy-Proof Rules |
---|---|
Authors | |
Issue Date | 1998 |
Publisher | Academic Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jet |
Citation | Journal Of Economic Theory, 1998, v. 78 n. 1, p. 157-166 How to Cite? |
Abstract | In a recent paper, Sprumont (1991,Econometrica59, 509-519) showed that the uniform rule (Benassy, 1982, "The Economics of Market Disequilibrium," Academic Press, 1982) is the only rule satisfyingstrategy-proofness,anonymity, andefficiencyon the single-peaked domain (Black, 1948,J. Polit. Econ.56, 23-34). This result motivates us to investigate whether there is a larger domain on which there exists a nontrivialstrategy-proofrule. We want such a domain to be as large as possible. We show that the single-plateaued domain (Moulin, 1984,Soc. Choice Welfare1, 127-147) is the unique maximal domain forstrategy-proofness,symmetry, andefficiency. Thus, we conclude that the assumption of single-peakedness essentially cannot be weakened if one insists onstrategy-proofness, together with the other two basic requirements.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D78. © 1998 Academic Press. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/177639 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 1.4 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 3.218 |
ISI Accession Number ID | |
References |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Ching, S | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Serizawa, S | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-12-19T09:39:23Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-12-19T09:39:23Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 1998 | en_US |
dc.identifier.citation | Journal Of Economic Theory, 1998, v. 78 n. 1, p. 157-166 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 0022-0531 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/177639 | - |
dc.description.abstract | In a recent paper, Sprumont (1991,Econometrica59, 509-519) showed that the uniform rule (Benassy, 1982, "The Economics of Market Disequilibrium," Academic Press, 1982) is the only rule satisfyingstrategy-proofness,anonymity, andefficiencyon the single-peaked domain (Black, 1948,J. Polit. Econ.56, 23-34). This result motivates us to investigate whether there is a larger domain on which there exists a nontrivialstrategy-proofrule. We want such a domain to be as large as possible. We show that the single-plateaued domain (Moulin, 1984,Soc. Choice Welfare1, 127-147) is the unique maximal domain forstrategy-proofness,symmetry, andefficiency. Thus, we conclude that the assumption of single-peakedness essentially cannot be weakened if one insists onstrategy-proofness, together with the other two basic requirements.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D78. © 1998 Academic Press. | en_US |
dc.language | eng | en_US |
dc.publisher | Academic Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jet | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartof | Journal of Economic Theory | en_US |
dc.title | A Maximal Domain for the Existence of Strategy-Proof Rules | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
dc.identifier.email | Ching, S: steve.ching@hku.hk | en_US |
dc.identifier.authority | Ching, S=rp01056 | en_US |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | en_US |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1006/jeth.1997.2337 | en_US |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-0000623725 | en_US |
dc.relation.references | http://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-0000623725&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpage | en_US |
dc.identifier.volume | 78 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issue | 1 | en_US |
dc.identifier.spage | 157 | en_US |
dc.identifier.epage | 166 | en_US |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000072222000007 | - |
dc.publisher.place | United States | en_US |
dc.identifier.scopusauthorid | Ching, S=16411142700 | en_US |
dc.identifier.scopusauthorid | Serizawa, S=7004199377 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0022-0531 | - |