Regulating municipal water supply concessions: accountability in transitional China

Abstract



The past three decades have witnessed the fundamental achievements of China’s marketization. Through this process, state-owned enterprises have been restructured, monopoly is giving way to competition and private sectors are increasingly participating in public service provision. The concept of concession was first introduced in public utilities through the Circular on Questions Concerning the Ratification of Pilot Foreign Invested Concession Projects (1995), after which there were many experimental projects with BOTs and TOTs. In 2002, with the issuance of Opinions on Accelerating the Marketization of Urban Utilities, the concession system was officially introduced in public utility regulation. In the same year, the water pipelines were opened to foreign investment; concessions have since been extended into integrated municipal water groups. Concessions have become the major approach of public utility provision.

In recent years, the accountability in concessions has raised wide concern. Problems exposed include fixed rate-of-return, state-owned assets losses, undue concession transfer, illegal concession award, unreasonable water tariff increase, and problematic service provision by private concessionaires. Commentators have claimed that an accountability gap exists in concessions. Taking water sector concessions as the subject of discussion, the author distinguishes three types of accountability: traditional bureaucratic accountability, legal accountability and public accountability. Through systematical examination of the problems, this dissertation attempts to achieve a better understanding of concession and its application in public utilities, and finds that the alleged accountability gap is attributed to traditional bureaucratic accountability and concession system per se.

Four aspects of regulation in water concessions are considered: concessionaire selection; water pricing regulation; regulation by contract; and the regulatory framework. The findings suggest that under concessions, traditional bureaucratic accountability is neither adequate nor appropriate to hold the government accountable. More formal legal rules on transparency, due process and public participation should be explored.