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- Publisher Website: 10.1029/95WR00322
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Article: Cost allocation of multiagency water resource projects: game theoretic approaches and case study
Title | Cost allocation of multiagency water resource projects: game theoretic approaches and case study |
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Authors | |
Issue Date | 1995 |
Citation | Water Resources Research, 1995, v. 31 n. 5, p. 1387-1393 How to Cite? |
Abstract | Water resource projects are often jointly carried out by a number of communities and agencies. Participation in a joint project depends on how costs are allocated among the participants and how cost shares compare with the cost of independent projects. Cooperative N-person game theory offers approaches which yield cost allocations that satisfy rationality conditions favoring participation. A new solution concept, the normalized nucleolus, is discussed and applied to a water re-use project in southern California. Results obtained with the normalized nucleolus are compared with those derived with more traditional solution concepts, namely, the nucleolus and the Shapley valley. -Authors |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/167118 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 4.6 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.574 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Lejano, RP | en_HK |
dc.contributor.author | Davos, CA | en_HK |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-09-28T04:04:29Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-09-28T04:04:29Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 1995 | en_HK |
dc.identifier.citation | Water Resources Research, 1995, v. 31 n. 5, p. 1387-1393 | en_HK |
dc.identifier.issn | 0043-1397 | en_HK |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/167118 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Water resource projects are often jointly carried out by a number of communities and agencies. Participation in a joint project depends on how costs are allocated among the participants and how cost shares compare with the cost of independent projects. Cooperative N-person game theory offers approaches which yield cost allocations that satisfy rationality conditions favoring participation. A new solution concept, the normalized nucleolus, is discussed and applied to a water re-use project in southern California. Results obtained with the normalized nucleolus are compared with those derived with more traditional solution concepts, namely, the nucleolus and the Shapley valley. -Authors | en_HK |
dc.language | eng | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartof | Water Resources Research | en_HK |
dc.title | Cost allocation of multiagency water resource projects: game theoretic approaches and case study | en_HK |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
dc.identifier.email | Lejano, RP: lejano@hku.hk | en_HK |
dc.identifier.authority | Lejano, RP=rp01666 | en_HK |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | en_US |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1029/95WR00322 | en_HK |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-0029503507 | en_HK |
dc.identifier.volume | 31 | en_HK |
dc.identifier.issue | 5 | en_HK |
dc.identifier.spage | 1387 | en_HK |
dc.identifier.epage | 1393 | en_HK |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:A1995QW76800022 | - |
dc.publisher.place | United States | en_HK |
dc.identifier.scopusauthorid | Lejano, RP=6602298801 | en_HK |
dc.identifier.scopusauthorid | Davos, CA=35550636500 | en_HK |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0043-1397 | - |