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Conference Paper: Reputation and Competition among Information Intermediaries
| Title | Reputation and Competition among Information Intermediaries |
|---|---|
| Authors | |
| Issue Date | 2012 |
| Publisher | Game Theory Society. |
| Citation | The 4th World Congress of the Game Theory Society (GAME 2012), Istanbul, Turkey, 22-26 July 2012. In World Congress of the Game Theory Society, 2012, p. 1-53 How to Cite? |
| Abstract | This paper investigates the e¤ect of competition on the reputation
mechanism in the market for information intermediaries such as rating
agencies. I use a dynamic model to endogenize the value of reputation to
enable comparison of equilibria under di¤erent market structures. Behav-
ior is determined in the model by weighing the current rating fee against
the future value the rating agency derives from enjoying a good reputa-
tion. I show that competition weakens the reputation mechanism, and
thus worsens the quality of information by reducing the value of a good
reputation but not the short-term gain of lying. |
| Description | Session ID 178: Reputations |
| Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/166258 |
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Lo, P | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2012-09-20T08:30:52Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2012-09-20T08:30:52Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2012 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.citation | The 4th World Congress of the Game Theory Society (GAME 2012), Istanbul, Turkey, 22-26 July 2012. In World Congress of the Game Theory Society, 2012, p. 1-53 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/166258 | - |
| dc.description | Session ID 178: Reputations | - |
| dc.description.abstract | This paper investigates the e¤ect of competition on the reputation mechanism in the market for information intermediaries such as rating agencies. I use a dynamic model to endogenize the value of reputation to enable comparison of equilibria under di¤erent market structures. Behav- ior is determined in the model by weighing the current rating fee against the future value the rating agency derives from enjoying a good reputa- tion. I show that competition weakens the reputation mechanism, and thus worsens the quality of information by reducing the value of a good reputation but not the short-term gain of lying. | - |
| dc.language | eng | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Game Theory Society. | - |
| dc.relation.ispartof | World Congress of the Game Theory Society | en_US |
| dc.title | Reputation and Competition among Information Intermediaries | en_US |
| dc.type | Conference_Paper | en_US |
| dc.identifier.email | Lo, P: peiyulo@hkucc.hku.hk | en_US |
| dc.identifier.authority | Lo, P=rp01080 | en_US |
| dc.description.nature | published_or_final_version | - |
| dc.identifier.hkuros | 209171 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.spage | 1 | - |
| dc.identifier.epage | 53 | - |