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Conference Paper: Equilibria of GSP for range auction
| Title | Equilibria of GSP for range auction |
|---|---|
| Authors | |
| Keywords | Online auctions Nash equilibria Envy-free Valuations |
| Issue Date | 2012 |
| Publisher | Springer Verlag. The Journal's web site is located at http://springerlink.com/content/105633/ |
| Citation | The 18th Annual International Computing and Combinatorics Conference (COCOON 2012), Sydney, Australia, 20-22 August 2012. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2012, v. 7434, p. 580-591 How to Cite? |
| Abstract | Position auction is a well-studied model for analyzing online auctions for internet advertisement, in which a set of advertisers bid for a set of slots in a search result page to display their advertisement links. In particular, it was proved in [10,11] that the Generalized Second Price (GSP) mechanism for position auction has many interesting properties. In this paper, we extend these results to range auction, in which a bidder may specify a range of slots he is interested in. We prove GSP for range auction has an envy free equilibrium, which is bidder optimal and has the minimum pay property. Further, this equilibrium is equal to the outcome of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. We also show that the social welfare of any equilibrium of GSP for range auctions is not far from the optimal; it is at least 1/2 of the optimal. © 2012 Springer-Verlag. |
| Description | LNCS v. 7434 has title: Computing and combinatorics: 18th Annual International Conference, COCOON 2012, Proceedings |
| Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/164931 |
| ISBN | |
| ISSN | 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.606 |
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Ting, HF | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | Xiang, X | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2012-09-20T08:12:28Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2012-09-20T08:12:28Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2012 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.citation | The 18th Annual International Computing and Combinatorics Conference (COCOON 2012), Sydney, Australia, 20-22 August 2012. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2012, v. 7434, p. 580-591 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.isbn | 978-3-642-32240-2 | - |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0302-9743 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/164931 | - |
| dc.description | LNCS v. 7434 has title: Computing and combinatorics: 18th Annual International Conference, COCOON 2012, Proceedings | - |
| dc.description.abstract | Position auction is a well-studied model for analyzing online auctions for internet advertisement, in which a set of advertisers bid for a set of slots in a search result page to display their advertisement links. In particular, it was proved in [10,11] that the Generalized Second Price (GSP) mechanism for position auction has many interesting properties. In this paper, we extend these results to range auction, in which a bidder may specify a range of slots he is interested in. We prove GSP for range auction has an envy free equilibrium, which is bidder optimal and has the minimum pay property. Further, this equilibrium is equal to the outcome of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. We also show that the social welfare of any equilibrium of GSP for range auctions is not far from the optimal; it is at least 1/2 of the optimal. © 2012 Springer-Verlag. | - |
| dc.language | eng | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Springer Verlag. The Journal's web site is located at http://springerlink.com/content/105633/ | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartof | Lecture Notes in Computer Science | en_US |
| dc.rights | The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com | en_US |
| dc.subject | Online auctions | - |
| dc.subject | Nash equilibria | - |
| dc.subject | Envy-free | - |
| dc.subject | Valuations | - |
| dc.title | Equilibria of GSP for range auction | en_US |
| dc.type | Conference_Paper | en_US |
| dc.identifier.email | Ting, HF: hfting@cs.hku.hk | en_US |
| dc.identifier.email | Xiang, X: xiang@hku.hk | - |
| dc.identifier.authority | Ting, HF=rp00177 | en_US |
| dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/978-3-642-32241-9_49 | - |
| dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-84865637736 | - |
| dc.identifier.hkuros | 210456 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.volume | 7434 | - |
| dc.identifier.spage | 580 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.epage | 591 | en_US |
| dc.publisher.place | Germany | - |
| dc.description.other | The 18th Annual International Computing and Combinatorics Conference (COCOON 2012), Sydney, Australia, 20-22 August 2012. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2012, v. 7434, p. 580-591 | - |
| dc.identifier.issnl | 0302-9743 | - |