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Conference Paper: Privacy preserving confidential forensic investigation for shared or remote servers

TitlePrivacy preserving confidential forensic investigation for shared or remote servers
Authors
KeywordsCommutative encryption
Homomorphic encryption
Privacy preserving forensics
Search on encrypted data
Computing technology
Issue Date2011
PublisherIEEE, Computer Society. The Journal's web site is located at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/conhome.jsp?punumber=1001543
Citation
The 7th International Conference on Intelligent Information Hiding and Multimedia Signal Processing (IIHMSP 2011), Dalian, China, 14-16 October 2011. In Proceedings of the 7th IIHMSP, 2011, p. 378-383 How to Cite?
AbstractIt is getting popular that customers make use of third party data service providers to store their data and emails. It is common to have a large server shared by many different users. This creates a big problem for forensic investigation. It may not be easy to clone a copy of data from the storage device(s) due to the huge volume of data. Even if it is possible to make a clone, there are many irrelevant information/data stored in the same device for which the investigators have no right to access. The other alternative is to let the service provider search the relevant information and retrieve the data for the investigator provided a warrant can be provided. However, sometimes, due to the confidentiality of the crime, the investigator may not want the service provider to know what information they are looking for or the service provider herself may be one of the suspects. The problem becomes even more obvious in terms of cloud computing technology. In this paper, we address this problem and using homomorphic encryption and commutative encryption, we provide two forensically sound schemes to solve the problem so that the investigators can obtain the necessary evidence while the privacy of other users can be protected and at the same time, the service provider cannot know what information the investigators are interested in. © 2011 IEEE.
DescriptionThe Best Paper Award
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/152021
ISBN
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorHou, Sen_US
dc.contributor.authorUehara, Ten_US
dc.contributor.authorYiu, SMen_US
dc.contributor.authorHui, CKen_US
dc.contributor.authorChow, KPen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-26T06:32:34Z-
dc.date.available2012-06-26T06:32:34Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.citationThe 7th International Conference on Intelligent Information Hiding and Multimedia Signal Processing (IIHMSP 2011), Dalian, China, 14-16 October 2011. In Proceedings of the 7th IIHMSP, 2011, p. 378-383en_US
dc.identifier.isbn978-0-7695-4517-2-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/152021-
dc.descriptionThe Best Paper Award-
dc.description.abstractIt is getting popular that customers make use of third party data service providers to store their data and emails. It is common to have a large server shared by many different users. This creates a big problem for forensic investigation. It may not be easy to clone a copy of data from the storage device(s) due to the huge volume of data. Even if it is possible to make a clone, there are many irrelevant information/data stored in the same device for which the investigators have no right to access. The other alternative is to let the service provider search the relevant information and retrieve the data for the investigator provided a warrant can be provided. However, sometimes, due to the confidentiality of the crime, the investigator may not want the service provider to know what information they are looking for or the service provider herself may be one of the suspects. The problem becomes even more obvious in terms of cloud computing technology. In this paper, we address this problem and using homomorphic encryption and commutative encryption, we provide two forensically sound schemes to solve the problem so that the investigators can obtain the necessary evidence while the privacy of other users can be protected and at the same time, the service provider cannot know what information the investigators are interested in. © 2011 IEEE.en_US
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherIEEE, Computer Society. The Journal's web site is located at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/conhome.jsp?punumber=1001543-
dc.relation.ispartofProceedings of the 7th International Conference on Intelligent Information Hiding and Multimedia Signal Processing, IIHMSP 2011en_US
dc.subjectCommutative encryptionen_US
dc.subjectHomomorphic encryptionen_US
dc.subjectPrivacy preserving forensicsen_US
dc.subjectSearch on encrypted dataen_US
dc.subjectComputing technology-
dc.titlePrivacy preserving confidential forensic investigation for shared or remote serversen_US
dc.typeConference_Paperen_US
dc.identifier.emailHou, S: shhou@hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.emailUehara, T: uehara@media.kyoto-u.ac.jpen_US
dc.identifier.emailYiu, SM: smyiu@cs.hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.emailHui, CK: hui@cs.hku.hk-
dc.identifier.emailChow, KP: chow@cs.hku.hk-
dc.identifier.authorityYiu, SM=rp00207en_US
dc.identifier.authorityHui, CK=rp00120en_US
dc.identifier.authorityChow, KP=rp00111en_US
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltexten_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/IIHMSP.2011.28en_US
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-83455164517en_US
dc.identifier.hkuros203063-
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-83455164517&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_US
dc.identifier.spage378en_US
dc.identifier.epage383en_US
dc.publisher.placeUnited States-
dc.description.otherThe 7th International Conference on Intelligent Information Hiding and Multimedia Signal Processing (IIHMSP 2011), Dalian, China, 14-16 October 2011. In Proceedings of the 7th IIHMSP, 2011, p. 378-383-
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridChow, KP=7202180751en_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridHui, LCK=8905728300en_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridYiu, SM=7003282240en_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridUehara, T=35243665300en_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridHou, S=36809489300en_US

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