External control and red tape: the mediating effects of client and organizational feedback

Abstract

Bozeman’s (1993, 2000) external control model of red tape posits that organizations with higher degrees of external control will have higher levels of red tape. According to the model, this is compounded by entropy affecting the communication of rules and their results, limited discretion over rules and procedures, and non-ownership of rules. However, the model predicts that red tape will be mediated by communication from clients and within the organization. Bozeman’s model is often cited in the literature, but it has not been subjected to empirical verification. This study tests the model using data from a multiple informant survey of 136 upper tier English local governments conducted in 2004 and several secondary sources. Statistical results show that external control does indeed lead to higher levels of red tape. We then test a number of organizational feedback mediators and find that client feedback does little to mediate the effects of red tape; the major factor is trust between politicians and officers. We discuss these findings and propose some changes to the model.