The Paderewski Puzzle and the Principle of Substitution

Abstract

In "A Puzzle about Belief," Kripke maintains that his famous Paderewski Puzzle cannot be solved simply by rejecting the Substitution Principle for coreferential proper names. Kripke thinks this shows that the usual reason given for rejecting the Substitution Principle, namely that by rejecting it we can solve Frege's puzzle about belief, is not wholly convincing. Hence, according to Kripke, we should be less quick to give up the Substitution Principle and the Strict Millian semantics for names of which it is a consequence. While Kripke is right that the Paderewski Puzzle does not depend on the Substitution Principle, it does, I argue, depend on a different principle, Weak Substitution, which I claim only Strict Millians will be willing to accept. I conclude that the Paderewski Puzzle is genuinely puzzling only for Strict Millians.