Cross-listing audit fee premiums: Theory and evidence

Abstract

We study the effects of cross-listings on audit fees. We first develop a model in which legal environments play a crucial role in determining the auditor's legal liability. Our model and analysis predict that auditors charge higher fees for firms that are cross-listed in countries with stronger legal regimes than they do for non-crosslisted firms and that the cross-listing audit fee premium increases with the difference in the strength of legal regimes between the cross-listed foreign country and the home country. We then empirically test these predictions. The results of our cross-country regressions strongly support our predictions. In addition, we find no significant crosslisting fee premium for firms that are cross-listed in countries whose legal regimes are no stronger than those of their home countries. This suggests that cross-listing audit fee premiums are associated with increased legal liability and not with increased audit complexity per se. Our findings help explain why cross-listing premiums occur and what determines their magnitude.