Incentive effects of common and separate queues with multiple servers: The principal-agent perspective

Abstract

A two-server service network has been studied by Gilbert and Weng [13] fromthe principal-agent perspective. In the model, services are rendered by twoindependent facilities coordinated by an agency. The agency must devise astrategy to allocate customers to the facilities and determine the compensation.A common queue allocation scheme and separate queue allocation scheme are thencompared. It has been shown that the separate queue system gives morecompetition incentives to the independent facilities and induces a higherservice capacity. The main aim of this paper is to extend the results of thetwo-server queueing model to the case of multiple-server queueing model. Ouranalysis shows that in the case of multiple servers the separate queueallocation scheme creates more competition incentives for servers to increasetheir service capacities. In particular, when there are not severe diseconomiesassociated with increasing service capacity, the separate queue allocationscheme gives a lower expected sojourn time in equilibrium. © 2009 IEEE.