Optimal Securities Auctions with Entry Costs

Professor Liu, Tingjun   (Principal Investigator (PI))

24

2017-12-16

179202

Optimal Securities Auctions with Entry Costs

Auctions with entry costs, Optimal auctions, Security-bid auctions

Finance,Economics

Business Studies (B)

17502717

General Research Fund (GRF)

2017

Completed

1 Identify the optimal mechanism in securities auctions with entry costs. 2 Provide comparative statics on how entry and seller’s revenues depend on entry costs and the number of potential bidders. 3 Study the way in which the optimal mechanism depends on o whether bidders incur entry costs before or after knowing their valuations for the auctioned asset. o the level of restrictions placed on the securities allowed. o the nature of the heterogeneity among bidders. 4 Provide policy implications for government’s sales of oil and gas fields.