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Article: Integrated configuration of platform products and supply chains for mass customization: A game-theoretic approach

TitleIntegrated configuration of platform products and supply chains for mass customization: A game-theoretic approach
Authors
KeywordsCommonality
Configuration game
Game theory
Mass customization
Modularity
Platform product
Supply chain
Issue Date2007
PublisherIEEE.
Citation
Ieee Transactions On Engineering Management, 2007, v. 54 n. 1, p. 156-171 How to Cite?
AbstractThis paper is concerned with optimizing the configuration of a set of platform products and the associated supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and multiple suppliers using a three-move dynamic game-theoretic approach. The variants in the product family share a common platform for developing/configuring variant modules which are substitutable in the sense that high-end module options can functionally replace low-end ones at higher prices. As the customer in the supply chain, the manufacturer takes its leading role by making the first move to give decisions on platform products development (PPD) and supplier selection. The concerned suppliers make the second move to optimize their decisions including price discounts and their ordering policies. The manufacturer finishes the game by taking the last move to make his ordering decisions. The ranges of the rational reactions for the players are derived from the analyses of their payoff models, and an enumerative algorithm is developed to find the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game through the technique of backward induction. The game model and the proposed solution procedure are illustrated through a series of simulation experiments and sensitivity analyses using a numerical example. The results have allowed us to draw some meaningful interpretations and useful managerial insights. The use of platform commonality and modularity has been found generally beneficial not only to the supply chain as a whole but also to individual players that are eventually configured into the game. Flexibility of the suppliers' capability is also found to affect the PPD decisions. © 2006 IEEE.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/44867
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 1.454
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.091
ISI Accession Number ID
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorHuang, GQen_HK
dc.contributor.authorZhang, XYen_HK
dc.contributor.authorLo, VHYen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2007-10-30T06:12:04Z-
dc.date.available2007-10-30T06:12:04Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_HK
dc.identifier.citationIeee Transactions On Engineering Management, 2007, v. 54 n. 1, p. 156-171en_HK
dc.identifier.issn0018-9391en_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/44867-
dc.description.abstractThis paper is concerned with optimizing the configuration of a set of platform products and the associated supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and multiple suppliers using a three-move dynamic game-theoretic approach. The variants in the product family share a common platform for developing/configuring variant modules which are substitutable in the sense that high-end module options can functionally replace low-end ones at higher prices. As the customer in the supply chain, the manufacturer takes its leading role by making the first move to give decisions on platform products development (PPD) and supplier selection. The concerned suppliers make the second move to optimize their decisions including price discounts and their ordering policies. The manufacturer finishes the game by taking the last move to make his ordering decisions. The ranges of the rational reactions for the players are derived from the analyses of their payoff models, and an enumerative algorithm is developed to find the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game through the technique of backward induction. The game model and the proposed solution procedure are illustrated through a series of simulation experiments and sensitivity analyses using a numerical example. The results have allowed us to draw some meaningful interpretations and useful managerial insights. The use of platform commonality and modularity has been found generally beneficial not only to the supply chain as a whole but also to individual players that are eventually configured into the game. Flexibility of the suppliers' capability is also found to affect the PPD decisions. © 2006 IEEE.en_HK
dc.format.extent1358046 bytes-
dc.format.extent1816 bytes-
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf-
dc.format.mimetypetext/plain-
dc.languageengen_HK
dc.publisherIEEE.en_HK
dc.relation.ispartofIEEE Transactions on Engineering Managementen_HK
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.rights©2007 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. However, permission to reprint/republish this material for advertising or promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or to reuse any copyrighted component of this work in other works must be obtained from the IEEE.en_HK
dc.subjectCommonalityen_HK
dc.subjectConfiguration gameen_HK
dc.subjectGame theoryen_HK
dc.subjectMass customizationen_HK
dc.subjectModularityen_HK
dc.subjectPlatform producten_HK
dc.subjectSupply chainen_HK
dc.titleIntegrated configuration of platform products and supply chains for mass customization: A game-theoretic approachen_HK
dc.typeArticleen_HK
dc.identifier.openurlhttp://library.hku.hk:4550/resserv?sid=HKU:IR&issn=0018-9391&volume=54&issue=1&spage=156&epage=171&date=2007&atitle=Integrated+Configuration+of+Platform+Products+and+Supply+Chains+for+Mass+Customization:+A+Game-Theoretic+Approachen_HK
dc.identifier.emailHuang, GQ:gqhuang@hkucc.hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityHuang, GQ=rp00118en_HK
dc.description.naturepublished_or_final_versionen_HK
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/TEM.2006.889074en_HK
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-33947275097en_HK
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-33947275097&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.volume54en_HK
dc.identifier.issue1en_HK
dc.identifier.spage156en_HK
dc.identifier.epage171en_HK
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000243953200012-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Statesen_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridHuang, GQ=7403425048en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridZhang, XY=7410275338en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridLo, VHY=7005645868en_HK

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