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Conference Paper: Cyber - Transparencies, assurance and deterrence

TitleCyber - Transparencies, assurance and deterrence
Authors
Issue Date2013
Citation
Proceedings of the 2012 ASE International Conference on Cyber Security, CyberSecurity 2012, 2013, p. 119-126 How to Cite?
AbstractCyber-has often been considered as a coordination and control, as opposed to collaborative influence, media. This conceptual-design paper, uniquely, builds upon a number of entangled, cross disciplinary research strands - integrating engineering and conflict studies - and a detailed literature review to propose a new paradigm of assurance and deterrence models. We consider an ontology for Cyber-sûréte, which combines both the social trusts necessary for [knowledge &, information] assurance such as collaboration by social influence (CSI) and the technological controls and rules for secure information management referred as coordination by rule and control (CRC). We posit Cyber-sûréte as enabling both a 'safe-to-fail' ecology (in which learning, testing and adaptation can take place) within a fail-safe supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA type) system, e.g. in a nuclear power plant. Building upon traditional state-based threat analysis, we consider Warning Time and the Threat equation with relation to policies for managing Cyber-Deterrence. We examine how the goods of Cyber-might be galvanised so as to encourage virtuous behaviour and deter and / or dissuade ne'er-do-wells through multiple transparencies. We consider how the Deterrence-escalator may be managed by identifying both weak influence and strong control signals so as to create a more benign and responsive cyber-ecology, in which strengths can be exploited and weaknesses identified. Finally, we consider declaratory / mutual transparencies as opposed to legalistic / controlled transparency. © 2012 IEEE.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/194440
ISI Accession Number ID

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorAtkinson, SR-
dc.contributor.authorWalker, D-
dc.contributor.authorBeaulne, K-
dc.contributor.authorHossain, L-
dc.date.accessioned2014-01-30T03:32:35Z-
dc.date.available2014-01-30T03:32:35Z-
dc.date.issued2013-
dc.identifier.citationProceedings of the 2012 ASE International Conference on Cyber Security, CyberSecurity 2012, 2013, p. 119-126-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/194440-
dc.description.abstractCyber-has often been considered as a coordination and control, as opposed to collaborative influence, media. This conceptual-design paper, uniquely, builds upon a number of entangled, cross disciplinary research strands - integrating engineering and conflict studies - and a detailed literature review to propose a new paradigm of assurance and deterrence models. We consider an ontology for Cyber-sûréte, which combines both the social trusts necessary for [knowledge &amp, information] assurance such as collaboration by social influence (CSI) and the technological controls and rules for secure information management referred as coordination by rule and control (CRC). We posit Cyber-sûréte as enabling both a 'safe-to-fail' ecology (in which learning, testing and adaptation can take place) within a fail-safe supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA type) system, e.g. in a nuclear power plant. Building upon traditional state-based threat analysis, we consider Warning Time and the Threat equation with relation to policies for managing Cyber-Deterrence. We examine how the goods of Cyber-might be galvanised so as to encourage virtuous behaviour and deter and / or dissuade ne'er-do-wells through multiple transparencies. We consider how the Deterrence-escalator may be managed by identifying both weak influence and strong control signals so as to create a more benign and responsive cyber-ecology, in which strengths can be exploited and weaknesses identified. Finally, we consider declaratory / mutual transparencies as opposed to legalistic / controlled transparency. © 2012 IEEE.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.relation.ispartofProceedings of the 2012 ASE International Conference on Cyber Security, CyberSecurity 2012-
dc.titleCyber - Transparencies, assurance and deterrence-
dc.typeConference_Paper-
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/CyberSecurity.2012.22-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-84881048825-
dc.identifier.spage119-
dc.identifier.epage126-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000326265700016-

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