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Article: Nonparametric Estimation Of Entry Cost In First-Price Procurement Auctions

TitleNonparametric Estimation Of Entry Cost In First-Price Procurement Auctions
Authors
Issue Date2013
PublisherJohn Wiley & Sons Ltd. The Journal's web site is located at http://jae.wiley.com
Citation
Journal Of Applied Econometrics, 2013, v. 28 n. 6, p. 1046-1065 How to Cite?
AbstractIn this paper, I investigate Samuelson's low-price auction model with entry costs. The model's equilibrium implies that the distribution of bids is truncated at the threshold for participation. I use the model to estimate the cost of participation in Michigan highway procurement auctions. The null hypothesis of zero entry costs is rejected. Using my empirical results, I then construct an estimate of the optimal auction, which employs regular policy tools such as entry fees. Finally, I demonstrate the savings that the Michigan government could have made on payments if optimal auctions had been employed. © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/177792
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 1.872
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 2.253
ISI Accession Number ID

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorXu, Pen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-12-19T09:39:55Z-
dc.date.available2012-12-19T09:39:55Z-
dc.date.issued2013en_US
dc.identifier.citationJournal Of Applied Econometrics, 2013, v. 28 n. 6, p. 1046-1065en_US
dc.identifier.issn0883-7252en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/177792-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, I investigate Samuelson's low-price auction model with entry costs. The model's equilibrium implies that the distribution of bids is truncated at the threshold for participation. I use the model to estimate the cost of participation in Michigan highway procurement auctions. The null hypothesis of zero entry costs is rejected. Using my empirical results, I then construct an estimate of the optimal auction, which employs regular policy tools such as entry fees. Finally, I demonstrate the savings that the Michigan government could have made on payments if optimal auctions had been employed. © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.en_US
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherJohn Wiley & Sons Ltd. The Journal's web site is located at http://jae.wiley.comen_US
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Applied Econometricsen_US
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.titleNonparametric Estimation Of Entry Cost In First-Price Procurement Auctionsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.emailXu, P: paixu@hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityXu, P=rp01120en_US
dc.description.naturepostprinten_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1002/jae.2264en_US
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-84884716341en_US
dc.identifier.eissn1099-1255-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000325094400006-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Kingdomen_US
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridXu, P=55048663700en_US

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