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Article: Nonparametric Estimation Of Entry Cost In First-Price Procurement Auctions
Title | Nonparametric Estimation Of Entry Cost In First-Price Procurement Auctions |
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Authors | |
Issue Date | 2013 |
Publisher | John Wiley & Sons Ltd. The Journal's web site is located at http://jae.wiley.com |
Citation | Journal Of Applied Econometrics, 2013, v. 28 n. 6, p. 1046-1065 How to Cite? |
Abstract | In this paper, I investigate Samuelson's low-price auction model with entry costs. The model's equilibrium implies that the distribution of bids is truncated at the threshold for participation. I use the model to estimate the cost of participation in Michigan highway procurement auctions. The null hypothesis of zero entry costs is rejected. Using my empirical results, I then construct an estimate of the optimal auction, which employs regular policy tools such as entry fees. Finally, I demonstrate the savings that the Michigan government could have made on payments if optimal auctions had been employed. © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/177792 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 2.3 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 2.130 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Xu, P | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-12-19T09:39:55Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-12-19T09:39:55Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2013 | en_US |
dc.identifier.citation | Journal Of Applied Econometrics, 2013, v. 28 n. 6, p. 1046-1065 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 0883-7252 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/177792 | - |
dc.description.abstract | In this paper, I investigate Samuelson's low-price auction model with entry costs. The model's equilibrium implies that the distribution of bids is truncated at the threshold for participation. I use the model to estimate the cost of participation in Michigan highway procurement auctions. The null hypothesis of zero entry costs is rejected. Using my empirical results, I then construct an estimate of the optimal auction, which employs regular policy tools such as entry fees. Finally, I demonstrate the savings that the Michigan government could have made on payments if optimal auctions had been employed. © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. | en_US |
dc.language | eng | en_US |
dc.publisher | John Wiley & Sons Ltd. The Journal's web site is located at http://jae.wiley.com | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartof | Journal of Applied Econometrics | en_US |
dc.title | Nonparametric Estimation Of Entry Cost In First-Price Procurement Auctions | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
dc.identifier.email | Xu, P: paixu@hku.hk | en_US |
dc.identifier.authority | Xu, P=rp01120 | en_US |
dc.description.nature | postprint | en_US |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1002/jae.2264 | en_US |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-84884716341 | en_US |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1099-1255 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000325094400006 | - |
dc.publisher.place | United Kingdom | en_US |
dc.identifier.scopusauthorid | Xu, P=55048663700 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0883-7252 | - |