File Download
Supplementary

Conference Paper: Investment in Concealable Information

TitleInvestment in Concealable Information
Authors
Issue Date2012
PublisherThe Econometric Society.
Citation
The Econometric Society North American Summer Meetings, Illinois, USA, 28 June-1 July 2012 How to Cite?
AbstractA sender who wants to influence a decision maker has no incentive to collect information if he has to reveal all evidence so obtained, because the expected value of posterior belief is equal to the prior. If he can conceal his evidence at a cost, he invests more in obtaining information when this cost is lower, and this dampens the incentive to conceal evidence as the decision maker would become skeptical upon hearing nothing. In equilibrium greater freedom to conceal information may lead to greater information revelation. A sender has less incentive to conceal evidence when there is another sender who can obtain conditionally independent information, regardless of whether the other sender has the same or the opposite bias.
DescriptionSession ID 59: Principal-Agent Models
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/160849

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorXu, Zen_US
dc.contributor.authorSuen, WCen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-16T06:22:12Z-
dc.date.available2012-08-16T06:22:12Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.citationThe Econometric Society North American Summer Meetings, Illinois, USA, 28 June-1 July 2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/160849-
dc.descriptionSession ID 59: Principal-Agent Models-
dc.description.abstractA sender who wants to influence a decision maker has no incentive to collect information if he has to reveal all evidence so obtained, because the expected value of posterior belief is equal to the prior. If he can conceal his evidence at a cost, he invests more in obtaining information when this cost is lower, and this dampens the incentive to conceal evidence as the decision maker would become skeptical upon hearing nothing. In equilibrium greater freedom to conceal information may lead to greater information revelation. A sender has less incentive to conceal evidence when there is another sender who can obtain conditionally independent information, regardless of whether the other sender has the same or the opposite bias.-
dc.languageengen_US
dc.publisherThe Econometric Society.-
dc.relation.ispartofEconometric Society North American Summer Meetingsen_US
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.titleInvestment in Concealable Informationen_US
dc.typeConference_Paperen_US
dc.identifier.emailXu, Z: zfxu@hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.emailSuen, WC: hrneswc@hkucc.hku.hken_US
dc.identifier.authorityXu, Z=rp01117en_US
dc.identifier.authoritySuen, WC=rp00066en_US
dc.description.naturepublished_or_final_version-
dc.identifier.hkuros203914en_US
dc.publisher.placeUnited States-

Export via OAI-PMH Interface in XML Formats


OR


Export to Other Non-XML Formats