The morality of harm and risk

Abstract

This thesis aims to answer moral problems associated with harm and risk under the rule utilitarianism framework. With this in mind, I examine Harsanyi’s three arguments for rule utilitarianism in details and consider whether rule utilitarianism is a plausible and well-established high-order normative theory for addressing middle and low-level moral problems. After setting out the first-order theoretical framework, I first focus on the topic of harming and allowing harm. The doctrine of doing and allowing harm states that everything being equal, doing harm is morally worse than allowing harm. In order to defend this doctrine, I provide a rule-utilitarian analysis of the distinction between negative rights and positive rights. I argue that our life and body are our own property. A rule respecting property rights is socially superior to a rule disrespecting property right, because (i) it can give rise to greater social expectations and incentives and; and (ii) it can achieve optimal allocations of resources. Further, I argue that an optimal rule should endorse less stringent positive rights, which requires people to assist others but also gives people the freedom to make decisions with regard to their own bodies, lives and other resources based on their own preferences. I argue this because stringent positive rights may result in sub-optimal social results, given that the information required for optimal stringent positive rights is not always complete and easy to obtain. Having shown why harming is morally worse than allowing harm, I turn to the topic of the permissibility of risk of harm. I first answer the question whether it is morally permissible to impose risk of harm on others. In answering this question, I propose and defend the High-risk thesis, which claims that we have prima facie rights against high-level risk of harm impositions; the permissibility of a high-risk activity is governed by three principles: (1) the consent principle, (2) the prevent disaster principle, and (3) the reciprocity principle. I argue that a rule, which respects the High-risk Thesis, results in the greatest social utility. Finally, I suggest and defend the ex ante risk-based liability theory. I argue that someone should be liable for the risk of harm she imposed on others, even if it has not caused the others to be harmed. I compare two competing theories of liability: the standard liability theory and McCarthy’s risk-liability theory. In doing so, I distinguish the ex ante risk-liability theory from these two. I agree with McCarthy that neither causation nor harm is fundamental to liability. But my account goes further that I argue for the method of ex ante compensation. I argue that in general ex ante compensation is better than ex post compensation in terms of reducing information costs and promoting optimal deterrence. And further I argue that if fault is relevant to liability, ex ante is better than ex post in terms of promoting retributive justice.