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Article: Time-dependent transport network improvement and tolling strategies

TitleTime-dependent transport network improvement and tolling strategies
Authors
KeywordsBuild-operate-and-transfer project
Competitive market
Monopoly market
Profitability
Social efficiency
Time-dependent network design
Issue Date2008
PublisherPergamon. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/tra
Citation
Transportation Research Part A: Policy And Practice, 2008, v. 42 n. 2, p. 376-391 How to Cite?
AbstractIn times of constrained resources, the government has three strategies, among others, to improve the transportation network over the planning horizon without relying on public expenditures to finance these improvements. The first is the government-as-the-provider strategy where the government acts as the toll road operator who builds the infrastructure and collects enough tolls to maximize social surplus. The second is that the private sector acts as a monopoly, who builds all the toll roads based on the build-operate-transfer (BOT) scheme. The third is the competitive market strategy, in which the government allows multiple operators to build different toll roads and collect tolls in a competitive manner. Which strategy is the best? To answer this question, this paper develops appropriate time-dependent network design models for each of these strategies, and examines the performances of these strategies in terms of consumer surplus, travel cost, social surplus, and profit over the planning horizon through numerical examples. A proof is given to point out that the government-as-the-provider strategy is the best in terms of social efficiency under some mild assumptions. This paper also discusses the practical and policy aspects of these strategies and the possible need of government regulations to constrain the design and management of BOT projects. © 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/91196
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 1.994
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.810
ISI Accession Number ID
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorSzeto, WYen_HK
dc.contributor.authorLo, HKen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-17T10:14:43Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-17T10:14:43Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_HK
dc.identifier.citationTransportation Research Part A: Policy And Practice, 2008, v. 42 n. 2, p. 376-391en_HK
dc.identifier.issn0965-8564en_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/91196-
dc.description.abstractIn times of constrained resources, the government has three strategies, among others, to improve the transportation network over the planning horizon without relying on public expenditures to finance these improvements. The first is the government-as-the-provider strategy where the government acts as the toll road operator who builds the infrastructure and collects enough tolls to maximize social surplus. The second is that the private sector acts as a monopoly, who builds all the toll roads based on the build-operate-transfer (BOT) scheme. The third is the competitive market strategy, in which the government allows multiple operators to build different toll roads and collect tolls in a competitive manner. Which strategy is the best? To answer this question, this paper develops appropriate time-dependent network design models for each of these strategies, and examines the performances of these strategies in terms of consumer surplus, travel cost, social surplus, and profit over the planning horizon through numerical examples. A proof is given to point out that the government-as-the-provider strategy is the best in terms of social efficiency under some mild assumptions. This paper also discusses the practical and policy aspects of these strategies and the possible need of government regulations to constrain the design and management of BOT projects. © 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.en_HK
dc.languageengen_HK
dc.publisherPergamon. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/traen_HK
dc.relation.ispartofTransportation Research Part A: Policy and Practiceen_HK
dc.subjectBuild-operate-and-transfer projecten_HK
dc.subjectCompetitive marketen_HK
dc.subjectMonopoly marketen_HK
dc.subjectProfitabilityen_HK
dc.subjectSocial efficiencyen_HK
dc.subjectTime-dependent network designen_HK
dc.titleTime-dependent transport network improvement and tolling strategiesen_HK
dc.typeArticleen_HK
dc.identifier.emailSzeto, WY:ceszeto@hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authoritySzeto, WY=rp01377en_HK
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.tra.2007.10.003en_HK
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-38749146298en_HK
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-38749146298&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.volume42en_HK
dc.identifier.issue2en_HK
dc.identifier.spage376en_HK
dc.identifier.epage391en_HK
dc.identifier.eissn1879-2375-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000254039700008-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Kingdomen_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridSzeto, WY=7003652508en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridLo, HK=7202085473en_HK

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