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Article: Cooperative game approaches to measuring network reliability considering paradoxes

TitleCooperative game approaches to measuring network reliability considering paradoxes
Authors
KeywordsCooperative game
Partial-cooperative Nash game
Stackelberg-Nash game
Stochastic Braess' paradox
Transport network reliability
Travel cost reliability paradox
Issue Date2011
PublisherPergamon. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/trc
Citation
Transportation Research Part C: Emerging Technologies, 2011, v. 19 n. 2, p. 229-241 How to Cite?
AbstractTraditionally, game-theoretic approaches to measuring transport network reliability have relied on the outcome of a game played between on the one hand users who seek minimum cost routes, and on the other hand, one or more evil entities or demons that seek to maximize the total expected network cost to the users by damaging links in the network. As the demons are assumed to be non-cooperative, this approach has been criticized that it cannot produce the worst-case solution for reliability analysis, contradicting the original purpose of adopting game-theoretic approaches. In this paper, two cooperative game formulations, the Stackelberg-Nash formulation and the partial-cooperative Nash formulation, are proposed to determine travel cost reliability. Their relationships are analyzed and their properties are examined. This paper also investigates under what condition(s) the classical non-cooperative demon behavior can lead to the worst-case solution. Numerical studies are provided to demonstrate: (i) the effects of the number of coalitions formed by demons on total network expected cost and network/Origin-Destination (OD) travel cost reliability; (ii) the paradoxical phenomenon that if one adds a road to a network then all the travelers may be worse off in terms of expected network travel cost and/or network travel cost reliability, and (iii) the possibility of the classical game-theoretic approach of overestimating network/OD travel cost reliability. © 2010 Elsevier Ltd.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/91194
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 3.075
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 2.062
ISI Accession Number ID
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorSzeto, WYen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-17T10:14:41Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-17T10:14:41Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_HK
dc.identifier.citationTransportation Research Part C: Emerging Technologies, 2011, v. 19 n. 2, p. 229-241en_HK
dc.identifier.issn0968-090Xen_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/91194-
dc.description.abstractTraditionally, game-theoretic approaches to measuring transport network reliability have relied on the outcome of a game played between on the one hand users who seek minimum cost routes, and on the other hand, one or more evil entities or demons that seek to maximize the total expected network cost to the users by damaging links in the network. As the demons are assumed to be non-cooperative, this approach has been criticized that it cannot produce the worst-case solution for reliability analysis, contradicting the original purpose of adopting game-theoretic approaches. In this paper, two cooperative game formulations, the Stackelberg-Nash formulation and the partial-cooperative Nash formulation, are proposed to determine travel cost reliability. Their relationships are analyzed and their properties are examined. This paper also investigates under what condition(s) the classical non-cooperative demon behavior can lead to the worst-case solution. Numerical studies are provided to demonstrate: (i) the effects of the number of coalitions formed by demons on total network expected cost and network/Origin-Destination (OD) travel cost reliability; (ii) the paradoxical phenomenon that if one adds a road to a network then all the travelers may be worse off in terms of expected network travel cost and/or network travel cost reliability, and (iii) the possibility of the classical game-theoretic approach of overestimating network/OD travel cost reliability. © 2010 Elsevier Ltd.en_HK
dc.languageengen_HK
dc.publisherPergamon. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/trcen_HK
dc.relation.ispartofTransportation Research Part C: Emerging Technologiesen_HK
dc.rightsNOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Transportation Research Part C: Emerging Technologies. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Transportation Research Part C: Emerging Technologies, 2011, v. 19 n. 2, p. 229-241. DOI: 10.1016/j.trc.2010.05.010-
dc.rightsCreative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License-
dc.subjectCooperative gameen_HK
dc.subjectPartial-cooperative Nash gameen_HK
dc.subjectStackelberg-Nash gameen_HK
dc.subjectStochastic Braess' paradoxen_HK
dc.subjectTransport network reliabilityen_HK
dc.subjectTravel cost reliability paradoxen_HK
dc.titleCooperative game approaches to measuring network reliability considering paradoxesen_HK
dc.typeArticleen_HK
dc.identifier.emailSzeto, WY:ceszeto@hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authoritySzeto, WY=rp01377en_HK
dc.description.naturepostprint-
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.trc.2010.05.010en_HK
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-78951469101en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros187899-
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-78951469101&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.volume19en_HK
dc.identifier.issue2en_HK
dc.identifier.spage229en_HK
dc.identifier.epage241en_HK
dc.identifier.eissn1879-2359-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000287437500007-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Kingdomen_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridSzeto, WY=7003652508en_HK
dc.identifier.citeulike7399171-

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