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Article: Principal-principal conflict in the governance of the Chinese public corporation

TitlePrincipal-principal conflict in the governance of the Chinese public corporation
Authors
KeywordsAgency costs
Board of directors
China
Ownership concentration
Principal-principal conflict
Issue Date2008
PublisherBlackwell Publishing Ltd.
Citation
Management And Organization Review, 2008, v. 4 n. 1, p. 17-38 How to Cite?
AbstractBy examining the level of ownership concentration across firms, we determine how principal-principal conflict, defined as the incongruence of ownership goals among shareholder groups in a corporation, impacts agency costs of Chinese boards of directors. Based on data from Chinese companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges during 1999-2003, we found that ownership concentration had a U-shaped relationship with board compensation, board size and the presence of independent directors. These results provide corroborating evidence that principal-principal conflict can lead to high agency costs. © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/86065
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 2.738
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 3.435
ISI Accession Number ID
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorSu, Yen_HK
dc.contributor.authorXu, Den_HK
dc.contributor.authorPhan, PHen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-06T09:12:24Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-06T09:12:24Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_HK
dc.identifier.citationManagement And Organization Review, 2008, v. 4 n. 1, p. 17-38en_HK
dc.identifier.issn1740-8776en_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/86065-
dc.description.abstractBy examining the level of ownership concentration across firms, we determine how principal-principal conflict, defined as the incongruence of ownership goals among shareholder groups in a corporation, impacts agency costs of Chinese boards of directors. Based on data from Chinese companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges during 1999-2003, we found that ownership concentration had a U-shaped relationship with board compensation, board size and the presence of independent directors. These results provide corroborating evidence that principal-principal conflict can lead to high agency costs. © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.en_HK
dc.languageengen_HK
dc.publisherBlackwell Publishing Ltd.en_HK
dc.relation.ispartofManagement and Organization Reviewen_HK
dc.rightsManagement & Organization Review. Copyright © Blackwell Publishing Ltd.en_HK
dc.subjectAgency costsen_HK
dc.subjectBoard of directorsen_HK
dc.subjectChinaen_HK
dc.subjectOwnership concentrationen_HK
dc.subjectPrincipal-principal conflicten_HK
dc.titlePrincipal-principal conflict in the governance of the Chinese public corporationen_HK
dc.typeArticleen_HK
dc.identifier.openurlhttp://library.hku.hk:4550/resserv?sid=HKU:IR&issn=1740-8776&volume=4&spage=17&epage=38&date=2008&atitle=Principal-principal+conflict+in+the+governance+of+the+Chinese+public+corporationen_HK
dc.identifier.emailXu, D: dxu@business.hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityXu, D=rp01119en_HK
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/j.1740-8784.2007.00090.xen_HK
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-68849116957en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros145612en_HK
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-68849116957&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.volume4en_HK
dc.identifier.issue1en_HK
dc.identifier.spage17en_HK
dc.identifier.epage38en_HK
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000256658200002-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Kingdomen_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridSu, Y=32868140400en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridXu, D=7404073938en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridPhan, PH=6603833294en_HK
dc.identifier.citeulike2385768-

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