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Article: Relational ties or customized contracts? An examination of alternative governance choices in China

TitleRelational ties or customized contracts? An examination of alternative governance choices in China
Authors
KeywordsChina
Emerging economies
Governance transitions
Legal contracts
Relational ties
Issue Date2008
PublisherPalgrave Macmillan Ltd. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jibs/index.html
Citation
Journal Of International Business Studies, 2008, v. 39 n. 3, p. 526-534 How to Cite?
AbstractAs business transactions become more complex in China - an increasingly market-driven economy - are managers more likely to employ relational ties or contracts? Consistent with the view that personal institutions govern transactions in China, our analysis of 361 buyer-supplier exchanges indicates that managers rely more on relational ties as asset specificity and uncertainty increase. We also find some support that impersonal institutions govern market transactions: as uncertainty increases, managers craft more customized contracts. Surprisingly, there is no association between contracts and asset specificity. These results hold for both local and foreign firms. © 2008 Academy of International Business All rights reserved.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/86019
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 3.62
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 4.208
ISI Accession Number ID
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorZhou, KZen_HK
dc.contributor.authorPoppo, Len_HK
dc.contributor.authorYang, Zen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-06T09:11:53Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-06T09:11:53Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_HK
dc.identifier.citationJournal Of International Business Studies, 2008, v. 39 n. 3, p. 526-534en_HK
dc.identifier.issn0047-2506en_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/86019-
dc.description.abstractAs business transactions become more complex in China - an increasingly market-driven economy - are managers more likely to employ relational ties or contracts? Consistent with the view that personal institutions govern transactions in China, our analysis of 361 buyer-supplier exchanges indicates that managers rely more on relational ties as asset specificity and uncertainty increase. We also find some support that impersonal institutions govern market transactions: as uncertainty increases, managers craft more customized contracts. Surprisingly, there is no association between contracts and asset specificity. These results hold for both local and foreign firms. © 2008 Academy of International Business All rights reserved.en_HK
dc.languageengen_HK
dc.publisherPalgrave Macmillan Ltd. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jibs/index.htmlen_HK
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of International Business Studiesen_HK
dc.rightsJournal of International Business Studies. Copyright © Palgrave Macmillan Ltd.en_HK
dc.subjectChinaen_HK
dc.subjectEmerging economiesen_HK
dc.subjectGovernance transitionsen_HK
dc.subjectLegal contractsen_HK
dc.subjectRelational tiesen_HK
dc.titleRelational ties or customized contracts? An examination of alternative governance choices in Chinaen_HK
dc.typeArticleen_HK
dc.identifier.openurlhttp://library.hku.hk:4550/resserv?sid=HKU:IR&issn=0047-2506&volume=39&spage=526&epage=534&date=2008&atitle=Relational+Ties+or+Customized+Contracts?+An+Examination+of+Alternative+Governance+Choices+in+Chinaen_HK
dc.identifier.emailZhou, KZ: kevinz@hkucc.hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityZhou, KZ=rp01127en_HK
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8400363en_HK
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-41249085975en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros143058en_HK
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-41249085975&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.volume39en_HK
dc.identifier.issue3en_HK
dc.identifier.spage526en_HK
dc.identifier.epage534en_HK
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000254380700012-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Kingdomen_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridZhou, KZ=7202914654en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridPoppo, L=6508060826en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridYang, Z=7405435932en_HK
dc.identifier.citeulike2608942-

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