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Article: Revenue sharing and control rights in team production: Theories and evidence from joint ventures

TitleRevenue sharing and control rights in team production: Theories and evidence from joint ventures
Authors
Issue Date2004
PublisherWiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc.. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.rje.org/
Citation
Rand Journal Of Economics, 2004, v. 35 n. 2, p. 277-305 How to Cite?
AbstractWe present a model of team production motivated by the stylized facts we found from a sample of 200 joint-venture contracts. The model incorporates the revenue-sharing contract into the property rights and the transaction cost theories of the firm, and it emphasizes the impact of expropriation. Joint control can be optimal as well as unilateral control. Our econometric analysis of the revenue-sharing and control arrangements offers strong support to our model motivated by property rights theory with self-investment but rejects that with cooperative investment. The model motivated by transaction cost theory leaves some important empirical findings unexplained. Our findings reject some existing theories of joint ownership.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/86013
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 1.582
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 3.544
SSRN
ISI Accession Number ID
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorBai, CEen_HK
dc.contributor.authorTao, Zen_HK
dc.contributor.authorWu, Cen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-06T09:11:48Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-06T09:11:48Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_HK
dc.identifier.citationRand Journal Of Economics, 2004, v. 35 n. 2, p. 277-305en_HK
dc.identifier.issn0741-6261en_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/86013-
dc.description.abstractWe present a model of team production motivated by the stylized facts we found from a sample of 200 joint-venture contracts. The model incorporates the revenue-sharing contract into the property rights and the transaction cost theories of the firm, and it emphasizes the impact of expropriation. Joint control can be optimal as well as unilateral control. Our econometric analysis of the revenue-sharing and control arrangements offers strong support to our model motivated by property rights theory with self-investment but rejects that with cooperative investment. The model motivated by transaction cost theory leaves some important empirical findings unexplained. Our findings reject some existing theories of joint ownership.en_HK
dc.languageengen_HK
dc.publisherWiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc.. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.rje.org/en_HK
dc.relation.ispartofRAND Journal of Economicsen_HK
dc.titleRevenue sharing and control rights in team production: Theories and evidence from joint venturesen_HK
dc.typeArticleen_HK
dc.identifier.openurlhttp://library.hku.hk:4550/resserv?sid=HKU:IR&issn=0741-6261&volume=35&issue=2&spage=277&epage=305&date=2004&atitle=Revenue+sharing+and+control+rights+in+team+production:+theories+and+evidence+from+joint+venturesen_HK
dc.identifier.emailTao, Z: ztao@hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityTao, Z=rp01097en_HK
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-4444274237en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros107182en_HK
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-4444274237&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.volume35en_HK
dc.identifier.issue2en_HK
dc.identifier.spage277en_HK
dc.identifier.epage305en_HK
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000223484500005-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Statesen_HK
dc.identifier.ssrn404001-
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridBai, CE=13805990500en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridTao, Z=7201884505en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridWu, C=7501664026en_HK

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