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Article: An empirical study on the incentives for governments to restructure state-owned enterprises

TitleAn empirical study on the incentives for governments to restructure state-owned enterprises
國有企業改制動因的實証研究
Authors
KeywordsGovernment (政府)
State-owned enterprises (國有企業)
Restructure (改制)
Privatization (私有化)
Issue Date2005
PublisherTsing Hua University Press (清華大學出版社). The Journal's web site is located at http://www.cje.sem.tsinghua.edu.cn/WKD/WebPublication/index.aspx?mid=cjesem
Citation
China Journal of Economics, 2005, v. 1 n. 1, p. 150-167 How to Cite?
經濟學報, 2005, v. 1 n. 1, p. 150-167 How to Cite?
AbstractWhy governments restructure some state-owned enterprises (SOE), while keep others as state-owned? What criteria are used when governments choose SOEs to restructure? In this paper, we use 1995-1997 firm level panel data of industrial enterprises in China to test established theories on SOE restructuring. We found that higher level governments place more weight on social stability when making restructuring decisions, and are less likely to restructure SOEs with higher debt ratios or surplus labor ratios. Our results also support the public interests theory, the income maximization theory, and the imperfect capital markets theory of SOE restructuring. However, there are mixed results about the rent seeking theory, and no support for the efficiency maximization theory.
政府為什麼要對部分國有企業進行改制,而保留在其他國有企業中的產權?政府的選擇標準是什麼?本文利用我國1995 — 1997年工業企業數據研究發現,基於社會穩定的考慮,高級別政府對負債率高和富餘職工多的國有企業改制比低​​級別政府謹慎,由此支持了關於改制的社會穩定理論。我們的研究還為關於改制的公眾利益理論、收入理論和欠發達資本市場理論提供了支持,部分地支持了尋租理論,而未對效率理論提供支持。
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/86004
ISSN

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorBai, CEen_HK
dc.contributor.authorLu, Jen_HK
dc.contributor.authorTao, Zen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-06T09:11:42Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-06T09:11:42Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_HK
dc.identifier.citationChina Journal of Economics, 2005, v. 1 n. 1, p. 150-167en_HK
dc.identifier.citation經濟學報, 2005, v. 1 n. 1, p. 150-167-
dc.identifier.issn2095-7254-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/86004-
dc.description.abstractWhy governments restructure some state-owned enterprises (SOE), while keep others as state-owned? What criteria are used when governments choose SOEs to restructure? In this paper, we use 1995-1997 firm level panel data of industrial enterprises in China to test established theories on SOE restructuring. We found that higher level governments place more weight on social stability when making restructuring decisions, and are less likely to restructure SOEs with higher debt ratios or surplus labor ratios. Our results also support the public interests theory, the income maximization theory, and the imperfect capital markets theory of SOE restructuring. However, there are mixed results about the rent seeking theory, and no support for the efficiency maximization theory.-
dc.description.abstract政府為什麼要對部分國有企業進行改制,而保留在其他國有企業中的產權?政府的選擇標準是什麼?本文利用我國1995 — 1997年工業企業數據研究發現,基於社會穩定的考慮,高級別政府對負債率高和富餘職工多的國有企業改制比低​​級別政府謹慎,由此支持了關於改制的社會穩定理論。我們的研究還為關於改制的公眾利益理論、收入理論和欠發達資本市場理論提供了支持,部分地支持了尋租理論,而未對效率理論提供支持。-
dc.languagechien_HK
dc.publisherTsing Hua University Press (清華大學出版社). The Journal's web site is located at http://www.cje.sem.tsinghua.edu.cn/WKD/WebPublication/index.aspx?mid=cjesemen_HK
dc.relation.ispartofChina Journal of Economicsen_HK
dc.relation.ispartof經濟學報-
dc.subjectGovernment (政府)zh_HK
dc.subjectState-owned enterprises (國有企業)zh_HK
dc.subjectRestructure (改制)zh_HK
dc.subjectPrivatization (私有化)zh_HK
dc.titleAn empirical study on the incentives for governments to restructure state-owned enterpriseszh_HK
dc.title國有企業改制動因的實証研究-
dc.typeArticleen_HK
dc.identifier.openurlhttp://library.hku.hk:4550/resserv?sid=HKU:IR&issn=0925-9864&volume=1&spage=150&epage=167&date=2005en_HK
dc.identifier.emailTao, Z: ztao@business.hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityTao, Z=rp01097en_HK
dc.description.naturelink_to_OA_fulltext-
dc.identifier.hkuros109994en_HK
dc.identifier.volume1-
dc.identifier.issue1-
dc.identifier.spage150-
dc.identifier.epage167-
dc.publisher.placeBeijing (北京)-

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