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Article: Some two-echelon supply-chain games: Improving from deterministic- symmetric-information to stochastic-asymmetric-information models

TitleSome two-echelon supply-chain games: Improving from deterministic- symmetric-information to stochastic-asymmetric-information models
Authors
KeywordsAsymmetric information
Stackelberg game
Supply chain models
Issue Date2005
PublisherElsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ejor
Citation
European Journal Of Operational Research, 2005, v. 161 n. 1, p. 203-223 How to Cite?
AbstractMany supply-chain and inventory models use the following two-echelon symmetric-information and deterministic gaming structure: a "manufacturer" wholesales a product to a "retailer," who in turn retails it to the consumer. The retail market demand varies with the retail price according to a deterministic "demand function" that is known to both the manufacturer and the retailer. It is then assumed that the "players" (the manufacturer and the retailer) arrive at their pricing and batch-size decisions through a Stackelberg game or a "fixed markup percentage" game. The first part of this paper reveals many implausible effects of demand-curve forms on the behavior of these gaming models. However, we do not merely conclude that two-echelon gaming results obtained via assuming one convenient demand-curve form can often become invalid under other demand-curve forms. More importantly, we argue in the second part of the paper that the various implausible effects revealed here suggest a different but more fundamental conclusion: the assumed non-cooperative games are themselves flawed, because "gaming" is meaningless and logically circular in a deterministic-and-symmetrical-information system. We then present an introductory illustration on how the introduction of stochasticity and information-asymmetry leads to more plausible two-echelon supply-chain gaming models. Together, the two parts demonstrate the necessity and practicality of using a stochastic-and-asymmetric-information instead of the prevalent deterministic-symmetric-information approach in many supply-chain models. © 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/85998
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 2.679
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 2.595
ISI Accession Number ID
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorLau, AHLen_HK
dc.contributor.authorLau, HSen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-06T09:11:38Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-06T09:11:38Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_HK
dc.identifier.citationEuropean Journal Of Operational Research, 2005, v. 161 n. 1, p. 203-223en_HK
dc.identifier.issn0377-2217en_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/85998-
dc.description.abstractMany supply-chain and inventory models use the following two-echelon symmetric-information and deterministic gaming structure: a "manufacturer" wholesales a product to a "retailer," who in turn retails it to the consumer. The retail market demand varies with the retail price according to a deterministic "demand function" that is known to both the manufacturer and the retailer. It is then assumed that the "players" (the manufacturer and the retailer) arrive at their pricing and batch-size decisions through a Stackelberg game or a "fixed markup percentage" game. The first part of this paper reveals many implausible effects of demand-curve forms on the behavior of these gaming models. However, we do not merely conclude that two-echelon gaming results obtained via assuming one convenient demand-curve form can often become invalid under other demand-curve forms. More importantly, we argue in the second part of the paper that the various implausible effects revealed here suggest a different but more fundamental conclusion: the assumed non-cooperative games are themselves flawed, because "gaming" is meaningless and logically circular in a deterministic-and-symmetrical-information system. We then present an introductory illustration on how the introduction of stochasticity and information-asymmetry leads to more plausible two-echelon supply-chain gaming models. Together, the two parts demonstrate the necessity and practicality of using a stochastic-and-asymmetric-information instead of the prevalent deterministic-symmetric-information approach in many supply-chain models. © 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.en_HK
dc.languageengen_HK
dc.publisherElsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ejoren_HK
dc.relation.ispartofEuropean Journal of Operational Researchen_HK
dc.subjectAsymmetric informationen_HK
dc.subjectStackelberg gameen_HK
dc.subjectSupply chain modelsen_HK
dc.titleSome two-echelon supply-chain games: Improving from deterministic- symmetric-information to stochastic-asymmetric-information modelsen_HK
dc.typeArticleen_HK
dc.identifier.emailLau, AHL: ahlau@business.hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityLau, AHL=rp01072en_HK
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.ejor.2003.08.040en_HK
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-5144220597en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros91997en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros107130-
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-5144220597&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.volume161en_HK
dc.identifier.issue1en_HK
dc.identifier.spage203en_HK
dc.identifier.epage223en_HK
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000224514500016-
dc.publisher.placeNetherlandsen_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridLau, AHL=7202626080en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridLau, HS=7201497264en_HK

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