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Article: Agency and Self-Enforcing Contracts

TitleAgency and Self-Enforcing Contracts
Authors
Issue Date2000
PublisherAcademic Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jce
Citation
Journal Of Comparative Economics, 2000, v. 28 n. 1, p. 80-94 How to Cite?
AbstractThis paper studies the role of agency in the self-enforcement of interfirm contracts. When interfirm transactions are carried out by the agents rather than the owners, the agents' incentive to breach a contract for the benefit of their firm is typically lower than that of the owners if doing so entails a personal cost or a loss of private benefits. Thus agency has a commitment value in making contracts self-enforcing. The cost of agency is the typical moral hazard problem. Implications are drawn for transition economies in which formal institutions for contract enforcement are weak.J. Comp. Econom., March 2000, 28(1), pp. 80-94. School of Business, The University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam Road, Hong Kong, China; Division of Social Science, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Clear Water Bay, Hong Kong, China. © 2000 Academic Press.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/85986
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 1.38
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.066
ISI Accession Number ID
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorTao, Zen_HK
dc.contributor.authorZhu, Ten_HK
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-06T09:11:30Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-06T09:11:30Z-
dc.date.issued2000en_HK
dc.identifier.citationJournal Of Comparative Economics, 2000, v. 28 n. 1, p. 80-94en_HK
dc.identifier.issn0147-5967en_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/85986-
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies the role of agency in the self-enforcement of interfirm contracts. When interfirm transactions are carried out by the agents rather than the owners, the agents' incentive to breach a contract for the benefit of their firm is typically lower than that of the owners if doing so entails a personal cost or a loss of private benefits. Thus agency has a commitment value in making contracts self-enforcing. The cost of agency is the typical moral hazard problem. Implications are drawn for transition economies in which formal institutions for contract enforcement are weak.J. Comp. Econom., March 2000, 28(1), pp. 80-94. School of Business, The University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam Road, Hong Kong, China; Division of Social Science, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Clear Water Bay, Hong Kong, China. © 2000 Academic Press.en_HK
dc.languageengen_HK
dc.publisherAcademic Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jceen_HK
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Comparative Economicsen_HK
dc.titleAgency and Self-Enforcing Contractsen_HK
dc.typeArticleen_HK
dc.identifier.openurlhttp://library.hku.hk:4550/resserv?sid=HKU:IR&issn=0147-5967&volume=28&spage=80&epage=94&date=2000&atitle=Agency+and+Self-enforcing+Contractsen_HK
dc.identifier.emailTao, Z: ztao@hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityTao, Z=rp01097en_HK
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1006/jcec.2000.1630en_HK
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-0042225652en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros48569en_HK
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-0042225652&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.volume28en_HK
dc.identifier.issue1en_HK
dc.identifier.spage80en_HK
dc.identifier.epage94en_HK
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000086201100004-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Statesen_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridTao, Z=7201884505en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridZhu, T=7202748304en_HK

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