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Article: Contract mixing in franchising as a mechanism for public-good provision

TitleContract mixing in franchising as a mechanism for public-good provision
Authors
Issue Date2000
PublisherBlackwell Publishing, Inc.
Citation
Journal Of Economics And Management Strategy, 2000, v. 9 n. 1, p. 85-113 How to Cite?
AbstractThis paper is concerned with the coexistence of company-owned units and franchised units in business format franchising and their different contractual arrangements. Drawing insights from case studies that indicate both the development and the maintenance of company-wide brand names and unit-specific sales activities are crucial to a franchise company, we construct a multitask model to account for such contract mixing in franchising. Intuitively, low-powered contracts are offered to some managers to induce effort for brand-name development and maintenance, while high-powered contracts are offered to the remaining managers to elicit sales activity and capture the beneficial effect of the company brand name. Franchising can thus be viewed as an organizational agreement for production involving brand-name products and services.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/85794
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 0.823
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.212
ISI Accession Number ID
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorBai, CEen_HK
dc.contributor.authorTao, Zen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-06T09:09:19Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-06T09:09:19Z-
dc.date.issued2000en_HK
dc.identifier.citationJournal Of Economics And Management Strategy, 2000, v. 9 n. 1, p. 85-113en_HK
dc.identifier.issn1058-6407en_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/85794-
dc.description.abstractThis paper is concerned with the coexistence of company-owned units and franchised units in business format franchising and their different contractual arrangements. Drawing insights from case studies that indicate both the development and the maintenance of company-wide brand names and unit-specific sales activities are crucial to a franchise company, we construct a multitask model to account for such contract mixing in franchising. Intuitively, low-powered contracts are offered to some managers to induce effort for brand-name development and maintenance, while high-powered contracts are offered to the remaining managers to elicit sales activity and capture the beneficial effect of the company brand name. Franchising can thus be viewed as an organizational agreement for production involving brand-name products and services.en_HK
dc.languageengen_HK
dc.publisherBlackwell Publishing, Inc.en_HK
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Economics and Management Strategyen_HK
dc.titleContract mixing in franchising as a mechanism for public-good provisionen_HK
dc.typeArticleen_HK
dc.identifier.openurlhttp://library.hku.hk:4550/resserv?sid=HKU:IR&issn=1058-6407&volume=9&spage=85&epage=113&date=2000&atitle=Contract+Mixing+in+Franchising+as+a+Mechanism+for+Public+Good+Provisionen_HK
dc.identifier.emailTao, Z: ztao@hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityTao, Z=rp01097en_HK
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1162/105864000567800-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-0039004455en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros53595en_HK
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-0039004455&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.volume9en_HK
dc.identifier.issue1en_HK
dc.identifier.spage85en_HK
dc.identifier.epage113en_HK
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000085757700004-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Statesen_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridBai, CE=13805990500en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridTao, Z=7201884505en_HK

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