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Article: Cooperative advertising, game theory and manufacturer-retailer supply chains

TitleCooperative advertising, game theory and manufacturer-retailer supply chains
Authors
KeywordsBargaining model
Co-op advertising
Leader-follower relationship
Pareto efficiencies
Supply chains
Issue Date2002
PublisherPergamon. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/omega
Citation
Omega, 2002, v. 30 n. 5, p. 347-357 How to Cite?
AbstractCooperative (co-op) advertising plays a significant role in marketing programs in conventional supply chains and makes up the majority of promotional budgets in many product lines for both manufacturers and retailers. We develop three strategic models for determining equilibrium marketing and investment effort levels for a manufacturer and a retailer in a two-member supply chain. Especially, we address the impact of brand name investments, local advertising, and sharing policy on co-op advertising programs in these models. The first model offers a formal normative approach for analyzing the traditional co-op advertising program where the manufacturer is the leader and the retailer is a follower. The second model provides a further analysis on this manufacturer-dominated relationship. The third model incorporates the recent market trend of retailing power shifts from manufacturers to retailers to analyze efficiencies of co-op advertising programs. We examine the effect of supply chain on the differences in profits resulting from following coordinated strategies as opposed to leader-follower strategies. A cooperative bargaining approach is utilized for determine the best co-op advertising scheme for achieving full coordination in the supply chain. © 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/85746
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 3.962
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 3.771
ISI Accession Number ID
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorLi, SXen_HK
dc.contributor.authorHuang, Zen_HK
dc.contributor.authorZhu, Jen_HK
dc.contributor.authorChau, PYKen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-06T09:08:46Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-06T09:08:46Z-
dc.date.issued2002en_HK
dc.identifier.citationOmega, 2002, v. 30 n. 5, p. 347-357en_HK
dc.identifier.issn0305-0483en_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/85746-
dc.description.abstractCooperative (co-op) advertising plays a significant role in marketing programs in conventional supply chains and makes up the majority of promotional budgets in many product lines for both manufacturers and retailers. We develop three strategic models for determining equilibrium marketing and investment effort levels for a manufacturer and a retailer in a two-member supply chain. Especially, we address the impact of brand name investments, local advertising, and sharing policy on co-op advertising programs in these models. The first model offers a formal normative approach for analyzing the traditional co-op advertising program where the manufacturer is the leader and the retailer is a follower. The second model provides a further analysis on this manufacturer-dominated relationship. The third model incorporates the recent market trend of retailing power shifts from manufacturers to retailers to analyze efficiencies of co-op advertising programs. We examine the effect of supply chain on the differences in profits resulting from following coordinated strategies as opposed to leader-follower strategies. A cooperative bargaining approach is utilized for determine the best co-op advertising scheme for achieving full coordination in the supply chain. © 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.en_HK
dc.languageengen_HK
dc.publisherPergamon. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/omegaen_HK
dc.relation.ispartofOmegaen_HK
dc.subjectBargaining modelen_HK
dc.subjectCo-op advertisingen_HK
dc.subjectLeader-follower relationshipen_HK
dc.subjectPareto efficienciesen_HK
dc.subjectSupply chainsen_HK
dc.titleCooperative advertising, game theory and manufacturer-retailer supply chainsen_HK
dc.typeArticleen_HK
dc.identifier.openurlhttp://library.hku.hk:4550/resserv?sid=HKU:IR&issn=0305-0483&volume=30 &issue=5&spage=347&epage=357&date=2002&atitle=Cooperative+advertising,+game+theory+and+manufacturer-retailer+supply+chains%27en_HK
dc.identifier.emailChau, PYK: pykchau@hkucc.hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityChau, PYK=rp01052en_HK
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/S0305-0483(02)00051-8en_HK
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-0036807798en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros81774en_HK
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-0036807798&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.volume30en_HK
dc.identifier.issue5en_HK
dc.identifier.spage347en_HK
dc.identifier.epage357en_HK
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000179715800004-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Kingdomen_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridLi, SX=7409244757en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridHuang, Z=7406221808en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridZhu, J=7405692810en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridChau, PYK=7102267201en_HK
dc.identifier.citeulike5971659-

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