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Article: Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules

TitleMulti-valued strategy-proof social choice rules
Authors
Ching, SZhou, L
Issue Date2002
PublisherSpringer Verlag. The Journal's web site is located at http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/index.htm
Citation
Social Choice And Welfare, 2002, v. 19 n. 3, p. 569-580 How to Cite?
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s003550100134
AbstractIn this paper we introduce a new definition of strategy-proofness for multi-valued social choice correspondences. We prove two Gibbard-Satterthwaite type results for strategy-proof social choice correspondences. These results show that allowing multiple outcomes as social choices will not necessarily lead to an escape from the Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/85719
ISSN
0176-1714
2021 Impact Factor: 0.874
2020 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.504
ISI Accession Number ID
WOS:000177456700008
References
References in Scopus

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorChing, Sen_HK
dc.contributor.authorZhou, Len_HK
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-06T09:08:23Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-06T09:08:23Z-
dc.date.issued2002en_HK
dc.identifier.citationSocial Choice And Welfare, 2002, v. 19 n. 3, p. 569-580en_HK
dc.identifier.issn0176-1714en_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/85719-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we introduce a new definition of strategy-proofness for multi-valued social choice correspondences. We prove two Gibbard-Satterthwaite type results for strategy-proof social choice correspondences. These results show that allowing multiple outcomes as social choices will not necessarily lead to an escape from the Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem.en_HK
dc.languageengen_HK
dc.publisherSpringer Verlag. The Journal's web site is located at http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/index.htmen_HK
dc.relation.ispartofSocial Choice and Welfareen_HK
dc.titleMulti-valued strategy-proof social choice rulesen_HK
dc.typeArticleen_HK
dc.identifier.openurlhttp://library.hku.hk:4550/resserv?sid=HKU:IR&issn=0176-1714&volume=19&issue=3&spage=569&epage=580&date=2002&atitle=Multi-Valued+Strategy-Proof+Social+Choice+Rulesen_HK
dc.identifier.emailChing, S: steve.ching@hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityChing, S=rp01056en_HK
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s003550100134en_HK
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-0036629369en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros82479en_HK
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-0036629369&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.volume19en_HK
dc.identifier.issue3en_HK
dc.identifier.spage569en_HK
dc.identifier.epage580en_HK
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000177456700008-
dc.publisher.placeGermanyen_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridChing, S=16411142700en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridZhou, L=36164720000en_HK
dc.identifier.issnl0176-1714-

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