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Article: The comparative statics of differential rents in two-sided matching markets

TitleThe comparative statics of differential rents in two-sided matching markets
Authors
Suen, W
KeywordsAssignment model
Skill premium
Stochastic dominance
Issue Date2007
PublisherSpringer New York LLC. The Journal's web site is located at http://springerlink.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre=journal&issn=1569-1721
Citation
Journal Of Economic Inequality, 2007, v. 5 n. 2, p. 149-158 How to Cite?
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10888-006-9034-8
AbstractThis paper studies how shifts in the distribution of quality on one side of the market affect earnings on the other side in a model of one-to-one matching. A more dispersed distribution of quality hurts the low ability agents on the other side because they are matched to inferior partners. Earnings being a differential rent in these markets, this pulls down the earnings of high quality agents as well. It is shown that a more dispersed ability distribution reduces total earnings on the opposite side of the market. Under some conditions, all agents on that side are hurt. © Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2006.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/85718
ISSN
1569-1721
2023 Impact Factor: 3.6
2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.210
References
References in Scopus

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorSuen, Wen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-06T09:08:23Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-06T09:08:23Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_HK
dc.identifier.citationJournal Of Economic Inequality, 2007, v. 5 n. 2, p. 149-158en_HK
dc.identifier.issn1569-1721en_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/85718-
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies how shifts in the distribution of quality on one side of the market affect earnings on the other side in a model of one-to-one matching. A more dispersed distribution of quality hurts the low ability agents on the other side because they are matched to inferior partners. Earnings being a differential rent in these markets, this pulls down the earnings of high quality agents as well. It is shown that a more dispersed ability distribution reduces total earnings on the opposite side of the market. Under some conditions, all agents on that side are hurt. © Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2006.en_HK
dc.languageengen_HK
dc.publisherSpringer New York LLC. The Journal's web site is located at http://springerlink.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre=journal&issn=1569-1721en_HK
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Economic Inequalityen_HK
dc.subjectAssignment modelen_HK
dc.subjectSkill premiumen_HK
dc.subjectStochastic dominanceen_HK
dc.titleThe comparative statics of differential rents in two-sided matching marketsen_HK
dc.typeArticleen_HK
dc.identifier.openurlhttp://library.hku.hk:4550/resserv?sid=HKU:IR&issn=1569-1721&volume=&spage=149&epage=158&date=2007&atitle=The+Comparative+Statics+of+Differential+Rents+in+Two-Sided+Matching+Marketsen_HK
dc.identifier.emailSuen, W: hrneswc@hkucc.hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authoritySuen, W=rp00066en_HK
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s10888-006-9034-8en_HK
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-33947218383en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros126785en_HK
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-33947218383&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.volume5en_HK
dc.identifier.issue2en_HK
dc.identifier.spage149en_HK
dc.identifier.epage158en_HK
dc.publisher.placeUnited Statesen_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridSuen, W=7006977946en_HK
dc.identifier.citeulike1229105-
dc.identifier.issnl1569-1721-

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