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Article: Mergers and investments in cost reduction with private information revisited

TitleMergers and investments in cost reduction with private information revisited
Authors
Wong, KPTse, MKS
KeywordsCost-reducing R&D investment
Information sharing
Mergers and acquisitions
Issue Date1997
PublisherElsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ijio
Citation
International Journal Of Industrial Organization, 1997, v. 15 n. 5, p. 629-634 How to Cite?
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0167-7187(96)01041-7
AbstractThis paper re-examines the model developed by Stenbacka (1991) which addresses the investment incentives of an innovating firm operating in anticipation of a merger with its rival in a Cournot duopoly setting. In contrast to Stenbacka, we find that the innovating firm need not always invest more should it conceal rather than reveal its R&D outcome prior to the takeover. Furthermore, we show that the ex ante incentive for the innovating firm to conceal its private information is perfectly consistent with earlier findings in the information sharing literature. © 1997 Published by Elsevier Science B.V.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/85653
ISSN
0167-7187
2023 Impact Factor: 1.7
2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.036
References
References in Scopus

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorWong, KPen_HK
dc.contributor.authorTse, MKSen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-06T09:07:38Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-06T09:07:38Z-
dc.date.issued1997en_HK
dc.identifier.citationInternational Journal Of Industrial Organization, 1997, v. 15 n. 5, p. 629-634en_HK
dc.identifier.issn0167-7187en_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/85653-
dc.description.abstractThis paper re-examines the model developed by Stenbacka (1991) which addresses the investment incentives of an innovating firm operating in anticipation of a merger with its rival in a Cournot duopoly setting. In contrast to Stenbacka, we find that the innovating firm need not always invest more should it conceal rather than reveal its R&D outcome prior to the takeover. Furthermore, we show that the ex ante incentive for the innovating firm to conceal its private information is perfectly consistent with earlier findings in the information sharing literature. © 1997 Published by Elsevier Science B.V.en_HK
dc.languageengen_HK
dc.publisherElsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ijioen_HK
dc.relation.ispartofInternational Journal of Industrial Organizationen_HK
dc.rightsInternational Journal of Industrial Organization. Copyright © Elsevier BV.en_HK
dc.subjectCost-reducing R&D investmenten_HK
dc.subjectInformation sharingen_HK
dc.subjectMergers and acquisitionsen_HK
dc.titleMergers and investments in cost reduction with private information revisiteden_HK
dc.typeArticleen_HK
dc.identifier.openurlhttp://library.hku.hk:4550/resserv?sid=HKU:IR&issn=0167-7187&volume=15&spage=629&epage=634&date=1997&atitle=Mergers+and+Investments+in+Cost+Reduction+with+Private+Information+Revisiteden_HK
dc.identifier.emailWong, KP: kpwongc@hkucc.hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.emailTse, MKS: ktse@hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityWong, KP=rp01112en_HK
dc.identifier.authorityTse, MKS=rp01101en_HK
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/S0167-7187(96)01041-7-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-0031479924en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros26033en_HK
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-0031479924&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.volume15en_HK
dc.identifier.issue5en_HK
dc.identifier.spage629en_HK
dc.identifier.epage634en_HK
dc.publisher.placeNetherlandsen_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridWong, KP=7404759417en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridTse, MKS=7103352647en_HK
dc.identifier.issnl0167-7187-

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