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Article: Wage structure when wage offers are private

TitleWage structure when wage offers are private
Authors
KeywordsConsumption smoothing
Insurance
Private wage offers
Wage structure
Issue Date1995
PublisherElsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/labeco
Citation
Labour Economics, 1995, v. 2 n. 1, p. 19-32 How to Cite?
AbstractIn this paper we analyse the structure of wages of workers in contract firms for a two-period economy in which there is interfirm mobility. A contract firm provides specific training for a worker during the first period, which increases his productivity if he stays in the second period, but the worker may quit to join an alternative firm after a successful search. When the worker cannot borrow in capital markets, the motive for consumption smoothing dominates and the contract firm acts as a banker and sets wage above marginal product in the first period and below it in the second. When the worker can borrow, insurance is the dominant concern and the contract firm acts instead as an insurer by setting the first-period wage below marginal product and the second-period wage above it. This dichotomy will fade away if the contract includes an exit fee as a quit penalty. © 1995.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/85535
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 0.899
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.127

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorLam, KCen_HK
dc.contributor.authorLiu, PWen_HK
dc.contributor.authorWong, YCen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-06T09:06:17Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-06T09:06:17Z-
dc.date.issued1995en_HK
dc.identifier.citationLabour Economics, 1995, v. 2 n. 1, p. 19-32en_HK
dc.identifier.issn0927-5371en_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/85535-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we analyse the structure of wages of workers in contract firms for a two-period economy in which there is interfirm mobility. A contract firm provides specific training for a worker during the first period, which increases his productivity if he stays in the second period, but the worker may quit to join an alternative firm after a successful search. When the worker cannot borrow in capital markets, the motive for consumption smoothing dominates and the contract firm acts as a banker and sets wage above marginal product in the first period and below it in the second. When the worker can borrow, insurance is the dominant concern and the contract firm acts instead as an insurer by setting the first-period wage below marginal product and the second-period wage above it. This dichotomy will fade away if the contract includes an exit fee as a quit penalty. © 1995.en_HK
dc.languageengen_HK
dc.publisherElsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/labecoen_HK
dc.relation.ispartofLabour Economicsen_HK
dc.subjectConsumption smoothingen_HK
dc.subjectInsuranceen_HK
dc.subjectPrivate wage offersen_HK
dc.subjectWage structureen_HK
dc.titleWage structure when wage offers are privateen_HK
dc.typeArticleen_HK
dc.identifier.openurlhttp://library.hku.hk:4550/resserv?sid=HKU:IR&issn=0927-5371&volume=2&issue=1&spage=19&epage=32&date=1995&atitle=Wage+structure+when+wage+offers+are+privateen_HK
dc.identifier.emailWong, YC: rycwong@hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityWong, YC=rp00068en_HK
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/0927-5371(95)80004-H-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-0043019831en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros8294en_HK
dc.identifier.volume2en_HK
dc.identifier.issue1en_HK
dc.identifier.spage19en_HK
dc.identifier.epage32en_HK
dc.publisher.placeNetherlandsen_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridLam, KC=7403657013en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridLiu, PW=7404618374en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridWong, YC=24395903200en_HK

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