The Coase Theorem and a Coasian construction economics and management research agenda

Abstract

This paper seeks to construct an empirical research agenda based on transaction cost reasoning informed by the Coase Theorem. It explains why the Coase Theorem has not been well received in the area of construction economics and management, as revealed by the relevant bibliometrics; develops a transaction cost-based research agenda for this arena based on the corollaries of the invariant version and optimality version of the Coase Theorem; and maps the current research endeavours that fall into that agenda. It has been explained that the Coase Theorem was based on Coase's 1960 article, 'The problem of social cost', and is not only compatible with, but also more general than, Coase's theory of the firm offered in his 1937 paper, 'The nature of the firm'. Hence, the 'two Coases' characterization, which suggests a dichotomy pro-organization/regulation stance versus a pro-free market stance, is fallacious.