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Article: The Confucian relational concept of the person and its modern predicament

TitleThe Confucian relational concept of the person and its modern predicament
Authors
Issue Date1999
PublisherThe Johns Hopkins University Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.press.jhu.edu/journals/kennedy_institute_of_ethics_journal/index.html
Citation
Kennedy Institute Of Ethics Journal, 1999, v. 9 n. 4, p. 325-346 How to Cite?
Abstract
The Confucian relational concept of the person has been proposed as an epistemically more cogent and ethically more attractive alternative to that of liberal individualism. Two arguments are raised against this proposal without defending liberal individualism. Ethically, Confucianism is vitiated by certain unattractive features that cannot be removed without reducing the Confucian relational concept of the person to an abstract and not very helpful notion of human relatedness. Epistemically, Confucianism commits the essentialist fallacy of treating its own concept of human relations as reflecting the nature of things. In view of these limitations, the Confucian relational concept of the person does not provide a viable framework for dealing with social issues including bioethics.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/80348
ISSN
2013 Impact Factor: 0.633
2013 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.474
References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorCi, Jen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-06T08:05:23Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-06T08:05:23Z-
dc.date.issued1999en_HK
dc.identifier.citationKennedy Institute Of Ethics Journal, 1999, v. 9 n. 4, p. 325-346en_HK
dc.identifier.issn1054-6863en_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/80348-
dc.description.abstractThe Confucian relational concept of the person has been proposed as an epistemically more cogent and ethically more attractive alternative to that of liberal individualism. Two arguments are raised against this proposal without defending liberal individualism. Ethically, Confucianism is vitiated by certain unattractive features that cannot be removed without reducing the Confucian relational concept of the person to an abstract and not very helpful notion of human relatedness. Epistemically, Confucianism commits the essentialist fallacy of treating its own concept of human relations as reflecting the nature of things. In view of these limitations, the Confucian relational concept of the person does not provide a viable framework for dealing with social issues including bioethics.en_HK
dc.languageengen_HK
dc.publisherThe Johns Hopkins University Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.press.jhu.edu/journals/kennedy_institute_of_ethics_journal/index.htmlen_HK
dc.relation.ispartofKennedy Institute of Ethics Journalen_HK
dc.titleThe Confucian relational concept of the person and its modern predicamenten_HK
dc.typeArticleen_HK
dc.identifier.openurlhttp://library.hku.hk:4550/resserv?sid=HKU:IR&issn=1054-6863&volume=9&spage=325&epage=346&date=1999&atitle=The+Confucian+Relational+Concept+of+the+Person+and+Its+Modern+Predicamenten_HK
dc.identifier.emailCi, J: jiweici@hkucc.hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityCi, J=rp01218en_HK
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-0033290927en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros52068en_HK
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-0033290927&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.volume9en_HK
dc.identifier.issue4en_HK
dc.identifier.spage325en_HK
dc.identifier.epage346en_HK
dc.publisher.placeUnited Statesen_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridCi, J=8210260700en_HK

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