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Article: The Confucian relational concept of the person and its modern predicament
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TitleThe Confucian relational concept of the person and its modern predicament
 
AuthorsCi, J
 
Issue Date1999
 
PublisherThe Johns Hopkins University Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.press.jhu.edu/journals/kennedy_institute_of_ethics_journal/index.html
 
CitationKennedy Institute Of Ethics Journal, 1999, v. 9 n. 4, p. 325-346 [How to Cite?]
 
AbstractThe Confucian relational concept of the person has been proposed as an epistemically more cogent and ethically more attractive alternative to that of liberal individualism. Two arguments are raised against this proposal without defending liberal individualism. Ethically, Confucianism is vitiated by certain unattractive features that cannot be removed without reducing the Confucian relational concept of the person to an abstract and not very helpful notion of human relatedness. Epistemically, Confucianism commits the essentialist fallacy of treating its own concept of human relations as reflecting the nature of things. In view of these limitations, the Confucian relational concept of the person does not provide a viable framework for dealing with social issues including bioethics.
 
ISSN1054-6863
2013 Impact Factor: 0.633
2013 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.474
 
ReferencesReferences in Scopus
 
DC FieldValue
dc.contributor.authorCi, J
 
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-06T08:05:23Z
 
dc.date.available2010-09-06T08:05:23Z
 
dc.date.issued1999
 
dc.description.abstractThe Confucian relational concept of the person has been proposed as an epistemically more cogent and ethically more attractive alternative to that of liberal individualism. Two arguments are raised against this proposal without defending liberal individualism. Ethically, Confucianism is vitiated by certain unattractive features that cannot be removed without reducing the Confucian relational concept of the person to an abstract and not very helpful notion of human relatedness. Epistemically, Confucianism commits the essentialist fallacy of treating its own concept of human relations as reflecting the nature of things. In view of these limitations, the Confucian relational concept of the person does not provide a viable framework for dealing with social issues including bioethics.
 
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dc.identifier.citationKennedy Institute Of Ethics Journal, 1999, v. 9 n. 4, p. 325-346 [How to Cite?]
 
dc.identifier.epage346
 
dc.identifier.hkuros52068
 
dc.identifier.issn1054-6863
2013 Impact Factor: 0.633
2013 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.474
 
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dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/80348
 
dc.identifier.volume9
 
dc.languageeng
 
dc.publisherThe Johns Hopkins University Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.press.jhu.edu/journals/kennedy_institute_of_ethics_journal/index.html
 
dc.publisher.placeUnited States
 
dc.relation.ispartofKennedy Institute of Ethics Journal
 
dc.relation.referencesReferences in Scopus
 
dc.titleThe Confucian relational concept of the person and its modern predicament
 
dc.typeArticle
 
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