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Article: Game-theoretic approach to simultaneous configuration of platform products and supply chains with one manufacturing firm and multiple cooperative suppliers

TitleGame-theoretic approach to simultaneous configuration of platform products and supply chains with one manufacturing firm and multiple cooperative suppliers
Authors
KeywordsCommonality
Configuration game
Game theory
Mass customization
Modularity
Platform product
Supply chain
Issue Date2010
PublisherElsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ijpe
Citation
International Journal Of Production Economics, 2010, v. 124 n. 1, p. 121-136 How to Cite?
AbstractThis paper deals with simultaneous configuration of platform products and supply chains. The supply chain consists of one manufacturer and multiple cooperative suppliers. A common platform is shared for developing/configuring the product family with variant modules which are substitutable in the sense that high-performance module options can replace low-performance ones. As the customer in the supply chain, the manufacturer takes its leading role by making the first move to produce decisions on platform products configuration (PPC) and supplier selection. The manufacturer and concerned suppliers then move cooperatively to make their ordering and pricing decisions with a common objective to maximize their joint payoffs. We derive the optimal solution ranges for this two-moves dynamic game according to Nash's bargaining model. An iterative algorithm is developed to find the subgame perfect equilibrium. A numerical study is conducted through a series of simulation experiments to illustrate how useful insights about the mutual impacts between the PPC and SCC (supply chain configuration) decisions can be obtained from the proposed game models and solution procedure. The results are further compared with those obtained in a previous study with non-cooperative suppliers. The comparative study allows us to appreciate managerial measures under different supply chain coordination schemes. It is found that a supply chain with cooperative suppliers is more effective by using the lot-for-lot policy and more competitive by accommodating higher product variety. © 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/74388
ISSN
2015 Impact Factor: 2.782
2015 SCImago Journal Rankings: 2.749
ISI Accession Number ID
Funding AgencyGrant Number
HKU Seed Fund Programme for Basic Research
NSFC70629002
Funding Information:

The authors would like to thank HKU Seed Fund Programme for Basic Research and NSFC (#70629002) for the financial supports.

References

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorZhang, Xen_HK
dc.contributor.authorHuang, GQen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-06T07:00:50Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-06T07:00:50Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_HK
dc.identifier.citationInternational Journal Of Production Economics, 2010, v. 124 n. 1, p. 121-136en_HK
dc.identifier.issn0925-5273en_HK
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/74388-
dc.description.abstractThis paper deals with simultaneous configuration of platform products and supply chains. The supply chain consists of one manufacturer and multiple cooperative suppliers. A common platform is shared for developing/configuring the product family with variant modules which are substitutable in the sense that high-performance module options can replace low-performance ones. As the customer in the supply chain, the manufacturer takes its leading role by making the first move to produce decisions on platform products configuration (PPC) and supplier selection. The manufacturer and concerned suppliers then move cooperatively to make their ordering and pricing decisions with a common objective to maximize their joint payoffs. We derive the optimal solution ranges for this two-moves dynamic game according to Nash's bargaining model. An iterative algorithm is developed to find the subgame perfect equilibrium. A numerical study is conducted through a series of simulation experiments to illustrate how useful insights about the mutual impacts between the PPC and SCC (supply chain configuration) decisions can be obtained from the proposed game models and solution procedure. The results are further compared with those obtained in a previous study with non-cooperative suppliers. The comparative study allows us to appreciate managerial measures under different supply chain coordination schemes. It is found that a supply chain with cooperative suppliers is more effective by using the lot-for-lot policy and more competitive by accommodating higher product variety. © 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.en_HK
dc.languageengen_HK
dc.publisherElsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ijpeen_HK
dc.relation.ispartofInternational Journal of Production Economicsen_HK
dc.subjectCommonalityen_HK
dc.subjectConfiguration gameen_HK
dc.subjectGame theoryen_HK
dc.subjectMass customizationen_HK
dc.subjectModularityen_HK
dc.subjectPlatform producten_HK
dc.subjectSupply chainen_HK
dc.titleGame-theoretic approach to simultaneous configuration of platform products and supply chains with one manufacturing firm and multiple cooperative suppliersen_HK
dc.typeArticleen_HK
dc.identifier.openurlhttp://library.hku.hk:4550/resserv?sid=HKU:IR&issn=0925-5273&volume=124&issue=1&spage=121&epage=136&date=2010&atitle=Game-theoretic+approach+to+simultaneous+configuration+of+platform+products+and+supply+chains+with+one+manufacturing+firm+and+multiple+cooperative+suppliersen_HK
dc.identifier.emailHuang, GQ:gqhuang@hkucc.hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityHuang, GQ=rp00118en_HK
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.ijpe.2009.10.016en_HK
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-75049084689en_HK
dc.identifier.hkuros165662en_HK
dc.relation.referenceshttp://www.scopus.com/mlt/select.url?eid=2-s2.0-75049084689&selection=ref&src=s&origin=recordpageen_HK
dc.identifier.volume124en_HK
dc.identifier.issue1en_HK
dc.identifier.spage121en_HK
dc.identifier.epage136en_HK
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000275635300013-
dc.publisher.placeNetherlandsen_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridZhang, X=35410995400en_HK
dc.identifier.scopusauthoridHuang, GQ=7403425048en_HK
dc.identifier.citeulike6070894-

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