File Download

There are no files associated with this item.

  Links for fulltext
     (May Require Subscription)
  • Find via Find It@HKUL
Supplementary

Article: Price coordination in a three-level supply chain with different channel structures using game-theoretic approach

TitlePrice coordination in a three-level supply chain with different channel structures using game-theoretic approach
Authors
KeywordsMulti-level supply chain
Pricing
Channel structure
Stackelberg game
Nash game
Issue Date2010
PublisherWorld Academic Union (World Academic Press). The Journal's web site is located at http://www.msem.org.uk/
Citation
International Journal of Management Science and Engineering Management, 2010, v. 5 n. 2, p. 83-94 How to Cite?
AbstractPricing is an important decision affecting the profitability of the supply chain system and individual channel members. It is important to coordinate pricing decisions for different channel members of the supply chain under different channel structures and power structures. Most studies to date have focused on price coordination in the traditional channel structure, mostly composed of two echelons. Little attention has been given to the multi-level channel. This paper studies price coordination problem in a threelevel supply chain composed of a single supplier, a single manufacturer and a single retailer. Three types of channel structures are considered, namely, the decentralized, the semi-integrated, and the integrated. Two power structures are studied for the decentralized and the semi-integrated channels. The leader-follower power structure is modeled as a Stackelberg game, where the manufacturer always takes the leadership, while the independent power structure is treated as a simultaneous non-cooperative game (simply Nash game). We explore the effects of power structures, channel structures and market parameters on equilibrium prices and profits. The results show that the manufacturer or the integrated members had better take the channel leadership. We also find that the integration for the manufacturer and the retailer cannot always improve their profits in a monopoly. Besides, when product cost is larger than a certain level, the chain members’ profits will increase as the market becomes more sensitive to the retail price.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/74248
ISSN

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorHuang, Yen_HK
dc.contributor.authorHuang, GQen_HK
dc.date.accessioned2010-09-06T06:59:25Z-
dc.date.available2010-09-06T06:59:25Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_HK
dc.identifier.citationInternational Journal of Management Science and Engineering Management, 2010, v. 5 n. 2, p. 83-94en_HK
dc.identifier.issn1750-9653-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/74248-
dc.description.abstractPricing is an important decision affecting the profitability of the supply chain system and individual channel members. It is important to coordinate pricing decisions for different channel members of the supply chain under different channel structures and power structures. Most studies to date have focused on price coordination in the traditional channel structure, mostly composed of two echelons. Little attention has been given to the multi-level channel. This paper studies price coordination problem in a threelevel supply chain composed of a single supplier, a single manufacturer and a single retailer. Three types of channel structures are considered, namely, the decentralized, the semi-integrated, and the integrated. Two power structures are studied for the decentralized and the semi-integrated channels. The leader-follower power structure is modeled as a Stackelberg game, where the manufacturer always takes the leadership, while the independent power structure is treated as a simultaneous non-cooperative game (simply Nash game). We explore the effects of power structures, channel structures and market parameters on equilibrium prices and profits. The results show that the manufacturer or the integrated members had better take the channel leadership. We also find that the integration for the manufacturer and the retailer cannot always improve their profits in a monopoly. Besides, when product cost is larger than a certain level, the chain members’ profits will increase as the market becomes more sensitive to the retail price.-
dc.languageengen_HK
dc.publisherWorld Academic Union (World Academic Press). The Journal's web site is located at http://www.msem.org.uk/-
dc.relation.ispartofInternational Journal of Management Science and Engineering Managementen_HK
dc.subjectMulti-level supply chain-
dc.subjectPricing-
dc.subjectChannel structure-
dc.subjectStackelberg game-
dc.subjectNash game-
dc.titlePrice coordination in a three-level supply chain with different channel structures using game-theoretic approachen_HK
dc.typeArticleen_HK
dc.identifier.openurlhttp://library.hku.hk:4550/resserv?sid=HKU:IR&issn=1750-9653&volume=5&issue=2&spage=83&epage=94&date=2010&atitle=Price+coordination+in+a+three-level+supply+chain+with+different+channel+structures+using+game-theoretic+approach-
dc.identifier.emailHuang, Y: wendy_huang_1983@126.comen_HK
dc.identifier.emailHuang, GQ: gqhuang@hkucc.hku.hken_HK
dc.identifier.authorityHuang, GQ=rp00118en_HK
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.hkuros169610en_HK
dc.identifier.volume5-
dc.identifier.issue2-
dc.identifier.spage83-
dc.identifier.epage94-

Export via OAI-PMH Interface in XML Formats


OR


Export to Other Non-XML Formats